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The conventional view is that the Patent Office examines patent applications
before issuance to assure compliance with the statutory criteria of patentability. Ex
post invalidation in district court litigation or Patent Office cancellation
proceedings then reviews the Patent Office’s work to correct errors that result from the
Patent Office’s shortcomings, bias, or “rational ignorance” that limits resources
spent on examination because of the irrelevance of most patents. Scholars, the
Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court have all endorsed this conventional view.
However, it is wrong—or at least overly simplistic. The American patent system is
only partially a system of ex ante patent examination. In other respects, it functions
as a registration system where significant aspects of patentability determinations are
left entirely to ex post patent invalidation in litigation and administrative
proceedings. Even if the Patent Office was allocated greater resources and its
examiners performed their assigned tasks perfectly, full evaluation of patentability
would be impossible due to structural features of examination that exclude certain
categories of prior art, prevent evaluation of the full extent of the patent owner’s
exclusive rights, and allow only a snapshot evaluation of a patentability question
that changes over time. Given that parts of the patentability evaluation are
structurally impossible in examination, the role of ex post invalidation is more
nuanced than traditionally described. In some instances, it performs a review function
to correct errors in the Patent Office’s examination. In other instances, however, it
serves an examination function to provide a first-instance evaluation of the aspects of
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patentability which are structurally unsuited for ex ante examination. Yet, the design
of the patent system does not reflect the structural limits of examination or varied roles
of ex post invalidation. A proper understanding of patent examination and
invalidation sheds light on current debates over the presumption of validity,
administrative patent cancellation, and the role of ex ante examination.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States patent system, three distinct institutions
evaluate whether a claimed invention meets the statutory criteria of
patentability and therefore warrants patent protection: patent
examiners in ex ante examination in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (Patent Office), federal district courts in litigation,
and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in Patent Office postissuance cancellation proceedings. Scholars and other commentators
vigorously debate the appropriate roles and relative performance of
these institutions in evaluating patentability.1 Yet, they share a
1. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 835–41
(2016) (describing debates regarding patent examination); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for
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common assumption that each performs the exact same task, with the
debate focused on how to apportion responsibility in a way that
optimizes the efficiency and accuracy of the patentability evaluation.2
According to conventional wisdom, the Patent Office is tasked with
examining patent applications, evaluating all of the relevant prior art
(i.e., existing knowledge in the field), and issuing a patent if and only
if the claimed invention satisfies all of the statutory criteria of
patentability.3 Under this criteria, the claimed invention must be new,
sufficiently different from what existed, useful, adequately described
and delineated in the patent document, and the type of subject matter
for which patent protection is granted.4 The Patent Office is widely
criticized for the quality of this ex ante patent examination, supposedly
issuing a large number of patents that fail the statutory criteria of
patentability.5 Commentators blame this poor performance on the
inherent error rate in any human endeavor, patent examiners’
shortcomings, the Patent Office’s biases, and/or the Patent Office’s
limited time and resources.6
Traditionally, federal courts in litigation were responsible for
invalidating issued patents that failed the statutory criteria of
patentability.7 However, courts too were seen as inadequate at policing
and invalidating issued patents.8 Congress responded by passing the
American Invents Act of 2011 (AIA),9 which significantly expanded
and strengthened the Patent Office proceedings for reconsidering,
and where appropriate, invalidating issued patents.10 The conventional

Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation Over Second-Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents:
When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1951
(2009) (advocating for greater role for litigation and lesser role for examination and
post-issuance review in policing patentability); Megan M. La Belle, Public Enforcement of
Patent Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1884–95 (2016) (explaining debate over patent
litigation and post-issuance proceedings).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Section I.B.1.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2012); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (stating that novelty
and a nonobvious subject matter are conditions for patentability).
5. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus NonInfringement, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 71, 87–88 (2013).
6. See infra Section I.B.2.
7. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 (2018).
8. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 237–40 (2015).
9. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
10. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1332–35 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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description of the role of ex post patent invalidation, whether in
district court litigation or Patent Office post-issuance proceedings, is
to review the Patent Office’s work to correct any mistakes and errors it
made in examination.11 Ex post invalidation thus supposedly eliminates
patents that never should have been issued because they failed the
statutory criteria of patentability at the time of examination.12 On this
view, any issued patent that fails the statutory criteria of patentability is
evidence of a Patent Office error, and the frequency of ex post
invalidations is proof of the Patent Office’s shortcomings.13
Scholars,14 the Federal Circuit,15 the Supreme Court,16 and even the
Patent Office17 have adopted this conventional wisdom of the functions
and relationship of ex ante patent examination and ex post
invalidation. Yet, it is wrong—or at least overly simplistic.
Ex ante examination is not institutionally structured to provide a
complete evaluation of the statutory criteria of patentability and, at
best, can provide only a partial evaluation. A patent examiner sitting at
a desk and searching online libraries and databases (or even the Patent
Office’s physical library) is not capable of identifying significant
portions of the wide swath of information (prior art) that can render
a claimed invention unpatentable as anticipated (i.e., not new) or
obvious (i.e., not sufficiently different). Prior art includes sources of
information that are not physically documented or would not appear
in libraries or databases—actual uses and sales of the claimed
invention, Ph.D. dissertations catalogued in a single library anywhere
in the world, product manuals and brochures, conference or trade
show presentations, etc. Ex ante examination lacks the inquisitorial
powers, such as hiring investigators, deposing witnesses, compelling
11. See infra Section I.C.
12. See infra Section I.C.
13. See infra Section I.C.
14. See, e.g., infra Sections I.B–C and scholars cited therein.
15. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 926 F.3d at 1331–34 (describing the purpose of
Patent Office post-issuance proceedings as correcting defects in original examination
resulting from Patent Office’s shortcomings).
16. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1370 (2018) (“Congress has created administrative processes that authorize the PTO to
reconsider and cancel patent claims that were wrongly issued.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96 (2011) (expressing an invalidity defense in litigation as an effort by
the defendant “to prove that the patent never should have issued in the first place”).
17. See Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (describing
the Patent Office’s argument on appeal that a PTAB finding of unpatentability is
evidence that the patent was erroneously issued in the first place).
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document production, etc., or the adversarial process, which involves
a motivated opponent willing to conduct this investigation, necessary
to identify this information.18
There are additional, less obvious ways in which ex ante examination
is structurally incapable of providing a complete patentability
evaluation. The confidentiality of the patent examination process, at
least for its first eighteen months, limits the examiner’s ability to search
unsecure sources of information, including the internet, and renders
nearly useless the limited means for third parties to submit information
in examination.19 In addition, examiners often lack the foreign
language skills necessary to determine whether a foreign patent or
publication, which qualify as prior art, is even potentially relevant and
warrants translation.20 Because patent examination occurs in the early
stage of the claimed invention’s development and lacks a motivated
adversary, the examiner’s only point of reference is the disclosure in the
patent document itself and the applicant’s arguments, making it difficult
for the examiner to appreciate the full scope of the claimed invention and
complete relevance of even identified prior art references.21
The structural realities that prevent a full patentability evaluation in
examination are not just examples of the Patent Office’s widely
recognized resource constraints or what Mark Lemley has called the
Patent Office’s “rational ignorance”—the idea that expending more
resources on ex ante examination would be wasteful because a large
percentage of patents are never litigated, licensed, or otherwise used.22
Addressing the structural realities that make a full patentability
evaluation impossible in examination would require fundamental
changes to the very nature of patent examination.23 Discussions of
Patent Office resource constraints and rational ignorance focus not on
major structural changes to examination but instead on increasing
Patent Office funding and examiner time allocations, with the focal
point being whether enough additional examiners should be hired to

18. See infra Sections II.A.1–2.
19. See infra Section II.A.3.
20. See infra Section II.A.4.
21. See infra Sections II.A.2, II.A.5.
22. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1497 n.6 (2001).
23. Cf. id. at 1511 (noting that most would consider a proposal that to “minimize the
risk of error we should conduct the equivalent of a full trial on validity (say, one thousand
hours of examination) before granting a patent” as ludicrous and unworkable).
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double examiner time per application.24 Increasing the money and time
allotted to examination might have a marginal impact on some of the
examination shortcomings identified above; for example, it may slightly
help with the translation issue or the examiner’s ability to appreciate the
full scope of the invention. But significantly addressing these issues would
require drastic reforms to core structural features of ex ante examination.
Moreover, even with unlimited resources and significant structural
changes, ex ante examination still could provide only a partial evaluation
of patentability along a temporal dimension. Ex ante examination
evaluates patentability at one point in time—before the patent is issued—
but whether a claimed invention satisfies the statutory criteria of
patentability can change over the patent’s nearly two-decade life. Jason
Rantanen has recognized the malleability of patent claims—that their
imprecision and the tools of patent law can be used to narrow or expand
the scope of the claimed invention over time.25 When this malleability is
used to expand claim scope, the claim may become invalid in light of the
prior art or disclosure in the specification, even if it was patentable under
a narrow understanding of the claimed invention at issuance.26
Moreover, the statutory criteria of patentability can and do change
over time as courts alter their interpretations of the broad, open-ended
statutory provisions, and these changes are applied retroactively to
previously issued patents.27 A claimed invention that was patentable
based on the statutory criteria at the time of issuance can become
invalid if the statutory criteria are made more demanding over time.28
As a result, the conventional assumption that ex post invalidation
necessarily shows that the patent never should have issued is mistaken.
Given these realities of patent examination, the function of ex post
invalidation in litigation or Patent Office post-issuance proceedings is
more complex and nuanced than commonly portrayed. At times, ex
post invalidation does perform a review function of correcting errors
24. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office,
72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 1017–21 (2019) (opining that the Patent Office simply needs to boost
its operating budget to accommodate the increased number of personnel required);
Lemley, supra note 22, at 1508–09 (defining the resource constraints and rational
ignorance issue as being about “how many of the bad patents that currently issue can be
smoked out merely by adding a few more hours to an examiner’s evaluation”).
25. Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895,
899, 941–42.
26. See infra Sections II.A.6, II.C.
27. See infra Section II.A.6.
28. See infra Section II.D.
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made in examination. These errors could be true examiner mistakes—
a claimed invention that was unpatentable at the time of examination
and could have and should have been caught by the examiner despite
structural limitations and resource constraints. Or these errors could
be inevitable errors resulting from the limited time and money
expended on ex ante examination, i.e., the Patent Office’s rational
ignorance—a claimed invention that was unpatentable at the time of
examination and could have been caught, despite the structural limits
of examination, with enough time and resources. Ex post invalidation
most clearly performs this review and error-correction function when it is
based on the prior art most structurally suited for examination: U.S.
patents, formal publications, or other prior art at issue in examination.29
At other times, ex post invalidation performs an examination function of
providing the first-instance evaluation of those aspects of the patentability
determination not structurally suited for ex ante examination. It provides an
initial examination of those categories of prior art not accessible in ex ante
examination, such as unpublished applications, real-world activities, and
informal publications. It also supplies an initial examination of the full claim
scope not recognizable in examination, either because of the examiner’s
limited points of reference or because of post-issuance stretching of claim
scope. This full claim scope can require additional consideration of the
patentability requirements of novelty and nonobviousness but is particularly
likely to implicate the disclosure requirements of enablement and written
description, which serve to prevent overbroad claims. Finally, ex post
invalidation can provide supplemental examination to account for judicial
developments that have retroactively made the statutory criteria of
patentability more restrictive over time. The explosion of invalidations after
the Supreme Court strengthened the requirements for patent-eligible
subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act30 is a compelling, recent
example of this function.31
Scholars have recognized pieces of these realities of patent examination
and invalidation (though often in passing or while focused on other
issues)—for example, that some prior art is essentially inaccessible in
patent examination;32 that increased examination time and resources will
29.
30.
31.
32.
easy to

See infra Section III.B.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See infra Section III.A.
See Lemley, supra note 22, at 1500 (“[M]uch of the most relevant prior art isn’t
find—it consists of sales or uses by third parties that don’t show up in any
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have no impact on patents that are invalid in light of this inaccessible prior
art;33 that patent claims can be expanded over time in a way that makes
them more likely to be invalid;34 and that patentable claimed inventions
can become invalid due to changes in the statutory criteria of
patentability.35 This Article builds on this work and puts together these
pieces, revealing a complete picture of the function and relationship of
patent examination and invalidation that is more varied, complex, and
nuanced than the conventional wisdom.
The design of the patent system reflects a formalistic model whereby
the Patent Office provides a comprehensive evaluation of patentability
and the ex post invalidation serves to review this work and correct any
errors made. Recognizing the complicated relationship of ex ante Patent
Office examination and ex post patent invalidation requires
reconsideration of the design of, and debates about, patent examination,
patent litigation, and Patent Office post-issuance proceedings.
First, the structural limits of ex ante examination would seem,
initially, to support proposals to expend little on ex ante examination
and perhaps even abolish it altogether. Yet, new empirical data by
Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman challenges Lemley’s “rational
ignorance” theory and suggests that greater investment in examination
would have a positive effect.36 Despite the structural limitations that
make it an ineffective substantive screen of patentability, the partial
examination that occurs ex ante in the Patent Office may be important
because it serves as a funnel of claim scope that narrows the patent

searchable database . . . .”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 577, 589, 599–600 (1999); Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent
Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 196 (2007).
33. See Kieff, supra note 1, at 1948 (“[N]o realistically available amount of time,
training, and access to commercial databases will help an examiner at her desk obtain
an obscure student thesis on the bookshelf of a foreign library or a specific laboratory
notebook corroborating the work of an individual researcher.”); Stephen Yelderman,
Prior Art in the District Court, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 880 (assuming that “no
plausible reform to examination practice would have precluded the issuance” of
patents later invalidated based on nontraditional publications or activity prior art).
34. See Jason Rantanen, How Malleability Matters, 6 IP THEORY 1, 23–27 (2016)
(arguing that patent challenges can use the malleability of patent claims to expand
their scope and make them more likely to be invalid).
35. See La Belle, supra note 1, at 1883 (“[A]s the legal standards for patentability
change—as many have in recent years—inventions that were once subject to a valid
patent are no longer worthy of protection.”).
36. See infra Section IV.A.
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owner’s exclusive rights, thereby mitigating the harm caused by the
presence of an unwarranted patent.37
Second, the realities of patent examination and invalidation are
further evidence for those who challenge the presumption of validity
and heightened burden of proof required to invalidate a patent in
litigation, which is premised on the presumption that an expert
administrative agency correctly did its job. While many have questioned
whether the assumption of correctness is warranted given the Patent
Office’s documented shortcomings, this Article questions whether
examination and invalidation even perform the same job in the first place.38
Third, more than nine months after issuance, Patent Office postissuance proceedings only allow anticipation and obviousness
challenges based on patents and printed publications. The realities of
examination and invalidation suggest that this design omits situations in
which a second round of Patent Office review might be most warranted—
when invalidity is based on activity prior art least amenable to ex ante
examination or is based on the disclosure requirements of enablement and
written description most likely to police claim expansion.39
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the conventional
view of the functions and relationship of ex ante examination and ex post
invalidation. Part II details the realities of patent examination, while Part III
lays out the varied functions that ex post invalidation performs. Part IV
analyzes the implications of recognizing the varied, complex, and nuanced
functions and relationship of ex ante examination and ex post invalidation.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PATENT EXAMINATION AND
INVALIDATION
Ex ante patent examination and ex post invalidation typically are
seen as performing identical functions—applying the statutory criteria
of patentability to determine whether patent protection is warranted.40
Specifically, patent examination is seen as performing this function in
the first instance and ex post invalidation is seen as reviewing the
Patent Office’s work to correct any errors. After first providing
background on patent examination and invalidation, this Part lays out
the conventional view of each.

37.
38.
39.
40.

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 987.
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A. The Basics of Patent Examination and Invalidation
The act of invention gives no enforceable rights against competitors.41
The inventor must petition the government to grant it exclusive rights in
the form of a patent.42 Specifically, the inventor must file a patent
application with the Patent Office.43 Since 1836, the Patent Office has
substantively examined patent applications before issuing them.44 “A
patent examiner with expertise in the relevant field reviews an
applicant’s patent claims, considers the prior art [i.e., the existing
knowledge in the field], and determines whether each claim meets the
applicable patent law requirements.”45
The applicant must satisfy several statutory criteria of patentability
to obtain patent protection. The claimed invention must be the type
of technological advancement for which patent protection is granted
(“patent eligible subject matter”) and must have a real-world, practical
function (“utility”) under section 101 of the Patent Act; must be an actual
invention that did not previously exist under section 102 (“novelty” or
“anticipation”); and must be sufficiently different from what did exist to
warrant patent protection under section 103 (“obviousness”).46 Pursuant
to section 112 of the Patent Act, the patent application also must
adequately teach a skilled person in the field how to make and use the
invention (“enablement”); must demonstrate that the inventor actually
possessed the invention (“written description”); and must claim the
invention with adequate precision (“definiteness”).47
The existing knowledge, or “prior art” in patent parlance, that can
render a patent anticipated under section 102 or obvious under

41. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
42. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1989)
(“[T]he federal patent scheme creates a limited opportunity to obtain a property right
in an idea.”).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).
44. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1755, 1761 (2011).
45. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2136–37.
46. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03.
47. § 112(a)–(b). A patent application must also disclose the best way the inventor
knows to implement the invention, but this is rarely a hurdle to patentability because
it is difficult to police in patent examination and not a ground for invalidity in litigation.
Id.; see also § 282(b)(3)(A) (declaring that even when a patent application fails to include
the best mode, it is not a reason for a claim of a patent to be cancelled, invalidated, or
unenforceable); Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 125, 126–27 (2012) (noting that elimination of best mode as a defense in
litigation “effectively eliminated the best mode requirement from patent law”).
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section 103 includes anything that “was patented, described in a
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to
the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention”
anywhere in the world, as well as that which was described in another
previously filed United States patent application provided that
application subsequently issues or is published.48
Because a patent application is presumed patentable, the Patent
Office must issue a patent unless it can establish that the application
fails one of the statutory criteria of patentability.49 If an examiner
rejects an application, the applicant can either explain why the patent
claims actually do satisfy the statutory criteria or amend the claims to
bring them within the statutory criteria.50 Ultimately, the Patent Office
is required to issue the patent “if on such examination it appears that
the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law.”51
However, ex ante patent examination has never been conclusive in the
American patent system.52 Most commonly, issued patents are subject to
invalidity challenges as affirmative defenses and/or counterclaims in
federal court litigation brought against those accused of violating, or
infringing, the patent’s exclusive rights or, less commonly, in federal court
declaratory judgment actions brought by accused infringers.53 A patent
claim is invalid, and therefore cancelled, if it fails any of the same statutory
criteria of patentability considered during patent examination.54 But an
issued patent is presumed valid in litigation, with the burden on the
challenger to prove it invalid by clear and convincing evidence.55
In 1980, Congress created ex parte reexamination, allowing issued
patents to be challenged and potentially cancelled within the Patent
Office itself.56 Ex parte reexamination remains available today and
allows the Patent Office to reconsider the novelty or nonobviousness

48. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(2); see also § 103 (incorporating section 102’s definition of
prior art). The America Invents Act of 2011 altered the statutory definition of prior art. Most
relevant for present purposes, it expanded nonpaper prior art to include activities anywhere
in the world. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012), with 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (pre-AIA).
49. Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 995 (2013).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012).
51. § 131.
52. Christopher Beauchamp, Repealing Patents, 72 VAND. L. REV. 647, 662–63 (2019).
53. La Belle, supra note 1, at 1884–85.
54. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2)–(3). The only exception is the best mode requirement.
§ 282(b)(3).
55. § 282(a); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
56. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016).
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of a patent based only on printed prior art (e.g., prior patents,
publications, etc.).57 Ex parte reexamination proceeds similarly to
initial patent examination, involving just the patentee and the patent
examiner and with amendments to claims liberally allowed to
overcome findings of unpatentability.58
The America Invents Act of 201159 (AIA) substantially overhauled
and expanded Patent Office post-issuance proceedings. First, it created
inter partes review, which allows any party to challenge an issued
patent for anticipation or nonobviousness based on printed prior art
from nine months after the patent issues through the life of the
patent.60 Second, the AIA created post grant review, which allows any
party to challenge a patent on any statutory criteria of patentability
within nine months of issuance.61 Third, the AIA created a temporary
covered business method patent review program lasting until 2020 that
allows a party accused of patent infringement to file a challenge in the
Patent Office on any statutory criteria of patentability but only if the
patent covers a nontechnological “method or corresponding apparatus
for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice,
administration, or management of a financial product or service.”62
The new AIA proceedings are adversarial proceedings involving
both the patentee and requester that include limited discovery, an oral
hearing, and some other features more reminiscent of litigation than
traditional examination or reexamination.63 The proceedings also are
resolved by three administrative patent judges of the newly created Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), rather than a patent examiner.64

57. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2209 (9th
ed. rev. 08.2017, last rev. Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP], https://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep [https://perma.cc/532J-3VBZ] (summarizing reexamination).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 307; MPEP, supra note 57, § 2209. From 1999 to 2012, Congress
also provided inter partes reexamination that allowed some participation by the
requestor. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(b), 315(b) (2006) (pre-AIA); MPEP, supra note 57, § 2609.
59. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
60. Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 633–35 (2012).
61. Id. at 631–32.
62. Id. at 636–37 (quoting Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 18(d)(1), 125
Stat. at 331).
63. Id. at 633–34, 636–37; Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law:
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1981–83 (2013).
64. Tran, supra note 60, at 633, 636; Wasserman, supra note 63, at 1983.
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B. The Conventional View of Patent Examination
1.

Assumed role of patent examination
As typically described, American “patent law follows an examination
model.”65 In this examination model, inventors have no exclusive rights in
their invention until the Patent Office has reviewed the claimed invention
described in the patent application, found it warranting patent protection,
and granted the patent.66 Specifically, the inventor must convince the
patent examiner that it is entitled to patent protection because it satisfies
the statutory criteria of patentability.67
This examination model is seen as a “substantive screen” that weeds
out those inventions that fail the statutory criteria of patentability and
ensures that only those inventions meeting all of the statutory criteria of
patentability receive patent protection.68 The Patent Office itself notes
that “[t]he public interest is best served, and the most effective patent
examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined,
the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information
material to patentability.”69 Under the substantive screen view of
examination, no patent failing the statutory criteria of patentability
“ought ever be issued.”70 Thus, “[w]hen examiners perform this task
correctly, all is well; inventors are precisely the people who are supposed
to enjoy the benefits of a patent monopoly.”71 The Federal Circuit has
emphasized the importance of this traditional role, noting that “our
patent system depends primarily on the [Patent Office’s] care in
screening out invalid patents during prosecution.”72
This examinational model is justified on the grounds “that, as a
society, we do not want to bear the costs of a significant number of

65. Ford, supra note 1, at 833.
66. Id. at 833–34.
67. Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine,
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 748 (2009) (“The patent system assumes that only those
patent applications that describe and claim a patentable advance are granted the
power to exclude.”); Ford, supra note 1, at 833; Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public
Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 55 (2012).
68. Ford, supra note 1, at 835–36; Merges, supra note 32, at 592; see also La Belle,
supra note 67, at 43 (describing examination as “ensur[ing] that the invention satisfies
all the requirements of patentability”).
69. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2019).
70. Merges, supra note 32, at 592.
71. Ford, supra note 1, at 842–43.
72. Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 412 F.3d 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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invalid patents.”73 Examination is described as ensuring that only those
who contributed something valuable to society receive the benefits of
exclusive rights to inventions.74 It also is seen as promoting notice and
reducing risk in investing in new inventions “since a patent that has
made it through examination is more likely to survive in court.”75
Scholars also posit that patent examination improves the information
value of patents by policing the statutory criteria to ensure that the
invention is fully and adequately disclosed.76
The examination model is seen as a unique feature of the patent
system, both historically and as compared to other forms of intellectual
property.77 Robert Merges explained that “historically the current
system of a professional corps of patent examiners grew out of our
disastrous experience with a patent registration system run amuck.”78
Under this registration system, which existed from 1793 to 1836, the
Patent Office issued patents as long as the proper documentation was
completed without ex ante examination.79 Evaluation of the statutory
criteria of patentability only occurred ex post in federal court, either
through an invalidity defense in infringement litigation or in a
separate revocation action initiated within three years of patent
issuance.80 The Patent Act of 183681 abolished this registration system
in favor of the current system of pre-issuance examination by expert
patent examiners.82 Reflecting conventional wisdom, Merges described
the system adopted in 1836 as the American patent system’s conclusive
rejection of a patent registration system because “the high [social] cost
of registering invalid patents was not worth whatever benefits were
provided by this low ‘entry barrier’ to inventors.”83 The examination
model is also viewed as distinguishing patent law from other areas of
73. Merges, supra note 32, at 593.
74. Ford, supra note 1, at 835–36.
75. Id. at 836.
76. Id. at 836–37.
77. Id. at 829, 834–35.
78. Merges, supra note 32, at 593.
79. Robert Merges, The Hamiltonian Origins of the U.S. Patent System, and Why They
Matter Today, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2559, 2568 (2019). From 1790 to 1793, the American
patent system used pre-issuance examination to ensure that the invention was both
novel and useful, but this was conducted by high-ranking government officials and
proved too burdensome. See La Belle, supra note 1, at 1881.
80. Beauchamp, supra note 52, at 665–66; Merges, supra note 79, at 2568.
81. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
82. La Belle, supra note 1, at 1881–82.
83. Merges, supra note 32, at 594–95.
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intellectual property, which either do not require an ex ante
proceeding for exclusive rights to vest or, if they do, require only
registration and not substantive examination.84
2.

The conventional criticisms of patent examination
Scholars widely recognize that the patent examinational model does
not live up to its theorized ideal. The scholarly near-consensus is that “the
[United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or PTO)] does a
poor job of examining patents, allowing significant numbers of invalid
patents to issue.”85 In response, scholars have proposed a variety of
“examination-based reforms” that seek “to improve the manner in which
the USPTO takes in patent applications and turns out issued patents.”86
One set of proposals attributes the Patent Office’s examination problems,
at least in part, to the incentives and biases of the Office as a whole, and
examiners individually, including: the Patent Office’s explicitly customerservice approach to applicants; Patent Office procedures that make it nearly
impossible to finally reject a patent application; appellate review of patent
denials but not grants; the Patent Office’s budgetary dependence on postissuance fees, rather than examination fees; the additional work required for
an examiner to explain a denial not required for a grant; and a skewed
examiner compensation system that rewards examiners for grants.87
Commentators call for reforms that would eliminate, reduce, or counter
these incentives and biases.88
Most commonly, the Patent Office’s examination problems are
attributed to the resource constraints faced by the Patent Office—finite
resources, a high volume of patent applications, and difficulty hiring a

84. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1526 (noting that patent law is unique in requiring
“government examination and approval as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit”); see also
Ford, supra note 1, at 834–35.
85. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 477 (2011); see also, e.g.,
Ford, supra note 5, at 87–88; Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 977–78; F. Scott
Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules,
45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 57 (2003); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1495–96; Jonathan Masur, Costly
Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 687 (2010); Stephen Yelderman,
Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 78 (2014).
86. Yelderman, supra note 85, at 78.
87. See Ford, supra note 1, at 837–39; Masur, supra note 85, at 687, 692–95; Melissa
F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law,
72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 417–20 (2011).
88. See, e.g., Yelderman, supra note 85, at 83–84 (noting these proposals).
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large number of high-quality examiners.89 Examiners thus only have
approximately twenty hours per application for all of the tasks of
examination: reviewing the application, conducting a prior art search,
comparing the prior art to the claimed invention, drafting one or more
office actions, responding to the applicant’s arguments, evaluating any
amendments, and potentially holding an interview with the applicant’s
attorney.90 Even patent examiners acknowledge this amount of time is
insufficient for a quality examination.91 Insufficient examination time is
likely to generate patent grants for claimed inventions that fail the
statutory criteria of patentability because the presumption of
patentability means that the patent issues unless the examiner, within
the time allotted, can establish and explain its unpatentability.92
Given the effects of Patent Office resource constraints on examination
quality, a common patent reform proposal is to increase funding to allow
the Patent Office to increase its workforce and spend more time
examining each application, particularly searching for prior art.93 Mark
Lemley and others have questioned the wisdom of doing so, since the
increased resources would be wasted for the vast majority of patents that
are never litigated or otherwise used.94 Relying on data, estimates, and
assumptions on the costs of patent prosecution, the costs of litigation, the
number of patents litigated or otherwise used, and the effect of doubling
examiner time on these numbers, Lemley concluded that “the PTO does
[not] do a very detailed job of examining patents, but we probably

89. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1331–32 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (Dyk, J., concurring) (“Resource constraints in the initial examination
period inevitably result in erroneously granted patents.”).
90. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 4 (eighteen hours). Compare Regents of
the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (twenty-two
hours), with Masur, supra note 85, at 687 (eighteen hours). The actual time allotted
per application varies with the technology classification of the invention and
experience level of the examiner. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 982–83.
91. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 926 F.3d at 1332 (disclosing data showing that
70% of patent examiners find the time allotted per patent application insufficient).
92. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 982.
93. See Lemley, supra note 22, at 1508–09 (summarizing proposals); Masur, supra
note 85, at 698 (summarizing proposals). Alternatively, some have suggested
outsourcing some of the Patent Office’s work, particularly prior art searching, to third
parties, whether the applicant, competitors, or independent search companies. Ford,
supra note 1, at 864–65 (summarizing proposals).
94. See Lemley, supra note 22, at 1511 (outlining how money spent on
improvements would likely be wasted as 95% of patents will either never be used or
subject to litigation).
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don’t want it to. It is ‘rationally ignorant’ of the objective validity of
patents, in economics lingo, because it is too costly for the PTO to discover
those facts.”95 Some scholars have gone further than Lemley, suggesting
moving more towards a registration system because any significant level
of ex ante patent examination may not be cost-justified.96
Recently, however, Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman utilized
newly available data and sophisticated economic analysis in place of
some of Lemley’s estimates and assumptions to conclude that “the
savings in future litigation costs and prosecution expenses associated
with giving examiners additional time per application outweighs the
costs of increasing examiner time allocations.”97 To them, “society
would be better off investing more resources into the [Patent Office
examination] to improve patent quality than relying on ex-post
litigation to weed out invalid patents.”98 They thus disagreed with
Lemley that the Patent Office was rationally ignorant, instead
concluding that “the present degree of ignorance—that is, the limited
ability of examiners to unearth prior art and hence reject patent
applications that fail to meet the patentability standards—is irrational.
In other words, the current level of resources the Patent Office extends
to review patent applications is insufficient.”99
C. The Conventional View of Ex Post Patent Invalidation
Ex post patent invalidation is typically described as performing the
exact same task as ex ante patent examination—determining whether
a claimed invention satisfies the statutory criteria of patentability.100
Formally, this is true, as section 282 of the Patent Act explicitly defines
one of the “defenses in any action involving the validity or
infringement of a patent” as “[i]nvalidity of the patent or any claim in
suit” with cross-reference to the portions of the Patent Act defining the
95. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1497.
96. See Kieff, supra note 85, at 58–59 (advocating for a “soft-look” examination by
the Patent Office, if any examination); see also Masur, supra note 85, at 692
(summarizing additional proposals).
97. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 980.
98. Id. at 981.
99. Id. at 1021.
100. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011) (“[T]he same factual
questions underlying the PTO’s original examination of a patent application will also bear
on an invalidity defense in an infringement action.”); see also La Belle, supra note 67, at 52
(describing an ex post invalidity determination as “an objective inquiry into whether the
patentability requirements were actually satisfied as the PTO concluded”).
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statutory conditions of patentability for patent issuance.101 Similarly,
the Patent Act defines the scope of Patent Office post grant review by
cross-referencing the grounds for invalidity that can be raised in
litigation under section 282 (which themselves cross-reference the
examination provisions).102 And it defines the scope of inter partes
review by cross-referencing the statutory provisions that establish the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements for patent issuance, sections
102 and 103, though subsequently limited to “prior art consisting of
patents or printed publications.”103
The typical justification for the seemingly duplicative efforts of
patent examination and ex post invalidation is that the Patent Office
errs in applying the statutory criteria of patentability in examination
and mistakenly issues patents that should have been denied.104 These
unwarranted patents impose significant social costs.105 Thus, the
purpose of ex post invalidation is seen as reviewing the work of the
Patent Office in evaluating the statutory criteria of patentability and
correcting errors made by the Patent Office in issuing patents for
unpatentable claimed inventions.106 Megan La Belle described the
basic question of invalidity in litigation as whether “the PTO, a
governmental agency, ma[d]e a mistake when it issued the patent[.]”107
Likewise, Saurabh Vishnubhakat explained that “[a]ll three types of
[Patent Office cancellation] proceedings are concerned essentially
with the same problem—correcting patent examination errors.”108

101. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012).
102. § 321(b) (defining the scope of post grant review).
103. § 311(b).
104. Ford, supra note 5, at 92–93 (describing invalidation in litigation as serving to
address the problem of Patent Office issuance of invalid patents); La Belle, supra note
1, at 1883 (explaining that one of the reasons that “the ability to police patents postissuance remains important” is because “the PTO sometimes makes mistakes and
grants bad patents”).
105. See Merges, supra note 32, at 592 (recounting various social costs that arise from
invalid patents).
106. See Wasserman, supra note 87, at 405 (describing invalidation in infringement
litigation as “judicial review” of Patent Office decisions in examination).
107. La Belle, supra note 67, at 52.
108. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, When Can the Patent Office Intervene in its Own Cases?, 73
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 201, 211 (2018).
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And the rate of ex post invalidation is often used as evidence of the
failures of ex ante examination.109
Thus, an ex post finding of invalidity is typically seen as “prov[ing]
that the patent never should have issued in the first place,” but for a
mistake by the Patent Office, because it failed the statutory criteria of
patentability at the time of issuance.110 An issued patent is entitled to a
presumption of validity in litigation, with the burden on the challenger
to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.111 The traditional
justification for the presumption of validity, and clear and convincing
burden, is “the presumption of administrative correctness of actions of
the agency charged with examination of patentability.”112 On this view,
the purpose of ex post invalidation is to review and correct Patent
Office errors, but, in doing so, generalist courts and juries should
presume that the expert examiners in the Patent Office did not
commit an error, absent strong evidence to the contrary.113 Conversely,
those who complain about the Patent Office’s examinational
shortcomings, or support its rational ignorance, suggest abolishing the
heightened burden of proof because the presumption that the Patent

109. See Colleen Chien, Comparative Patent Quality, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71, 72–73 (2018)
(relying on high court and PTAB invalidation rates as evidence for “[t]he perception
that the USPTO makes many mistakes”); Ford, supra note 5, at 87–88 (relying on the
fact that “nearly half of all litigated patents that make it to a final judgment are
invalidated by the courts” as evidence that “patent examiners do not do their job
particularly well” and that “the PTO issu[es] many invalid patents”); Ford, supra note
1, at 837–38 (relying on fact that “nearly half of litigated patents that make it to a final
judgment are invalidated” as “evidence shows clearly that examiners grant many
invalid patents”); Yelderman, supra note 85, at 82 (using the fact that “roughly half of
litigated patents are found to contain one or more invalid claims” as evidence that “the
USPTO makes mistakes” in examination).
110. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96–97 (2011).
111. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (outlining the presumption of validity); accord
i4i, 564 U.S. at 97.
112. Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98
F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also i4i, 564 U.S. at 97 (quoting Federal Circuit
precedent adopting this rationale).
113. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007) (describing “the
rationale underlying the presumption” of validity as “that the PTO, in its expertise, has
approved the claim”); Ford, supra note 5, at 103 (“Since such [examination] decisions
are made only after extensive examination by expert patent examiners, the story goes,
they are likely to be correct and are therefore entitled to some deference.”).
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Office did its job correctly in applying the statutory criteria of
patentability is unwarranted.114
The recent expansion in Patent Office post-issuance proceedings
also results from the conventional view that ex post invalidation serves
to correct Patent Office errors or mistakes resulting from the Patent
Office’s flaws, biases, resource constraints, and rational ignorance.
Commentators long proposed post-issuance Patent Office review and
cancellation of patents to allow greater participation by competitors
and others with valuable information relating to patentability and to
allow the Patent Office to efficiently apportion its resources to those
patents that had post-issuance relevance.115 Congress adopted these
proposals in the AIA.116 In response to the effectiveness of the new
procedures at invalidating issued patents and the large number of
patents invalidated, some have questioned the propriety of one arm of
the Patent Office examining and issuing patents only to subsequently
have another arm review and cancel them, assuming (again) that these
are duplicative proceedings addressing the same question.117
***
The conventional account of the relationship between ex ante
patent examination and ex post invalidation, whether in litigation or
Patent Office cancellation proceedings, has three basic premises. First,
ex ante examination and ex post invalidation perform the exact same
function of evaluating claimed inventions for compliance with the
statutory criteria of patentability and are therefore interchangeable

114. Ford, supra note 5, at 103–04; Lemley, supra note 22, at 1528–29 (arguing for
the paring back of the presumption of validity).
115. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1333–37 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (describing history of perceived need for Patent Office post-issuance
cancellation proceedings to address resource constraints and mistakes of initial
examination); Ford, supra note 5, at 91–93 (summarizing this view); Merges, supra note
32, at 610–15.
116. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 926 F.3d at 1335 (explaining the new procedures
adopted within the AIA).
117. See, e.g., ALDEN ABBOTT ET AL., REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT, CRIPPLING THE
INNOVATION ECONOMY: REGULATORY OVERREACH AT THE PATENT OFFICE 1, 21, 22 (2017),
https://regproject.org/wp-content/uploads/RTP-Intellectual-Property-Working-GroupPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F7H-R9HQ] (“Rather than fixing problems with the
patent examining corps, Congress created a second group of people within the same
agency to undo their work. Now there is a large patent examination staff to issue
patents and a separate PTAB staff to destroy those patents. What an odd, and
inefficient, system.”).
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substitutes for each other.118 Second, the ex post invalidation of a
patent demonstrates that the patent failed the statutory criteria of
patentability at the time of issuance and therefore the Patent Office
erred in granting it.119 Third, designing ex ante examination and ex
post invalidation represents a financial trade-off between investing
more in ex ante examination, making ex post invalidation less
necessary, or investing less in ex ante examination, making ex post
invalidation more necessary.120
II. THE REALITY OF PATENT EXAMINATION
Patent examination is structured to provide, at best, only a partial
evaluation of whether a claimed invention satisfies the statutory criteria
of patentability. This is not simply an acknowledgement that there is an
inevitable risk of error in any human endeavor, especially one as complex,
information-intensive, and dependent on imprecise language as patent
examination.121 Nor is it merely a recapitulation of the well-recognized
incentives, biases, resource constraints, and potential rational
ignorance of examination.122
Rather, the very nature of patent examination prevents a complete
patentability evaluation, even if examiners performed their assigned
tasks perfectly. The core structure of patent examination prevents
examiners from accessing some categories of prior art necessary to
fully evaluate patentability, identifying and examining the full scope of
the claimed rights, and determining whether the claimed invention
will remain patentable over the full life of the patent rights. Better
118. See, e.g., Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 987 (“Patent examiners, the
adjudicatory board at the Patent Office, and the federal courts are all tasked with applying the
patentability standards and assessing the validity of inventions seeking patent protection.”).
119. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96 (2011); La Belle,
supra note 67, at 52.
120. See, e.g., Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 981 (“This Article seeks to
provide a take on the classic regulatory question: Should society increase the resources of
the Patent Office to weed out bad patents, or should society instead reserve a larger residual
role for the courts to invalidate improvidently granted patents?”); Lemley, supra note 22, at
1497 (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper
for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases than to invest
additional resources examining patents that will never be heard from again.”).
121. R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2135, 2146 (2009) (“[E]ven under the best of circumstances, one would expect a
nontrivial number of invalid patents to slip through the system and a number of
patentable inventions to be inappropriately rejected.”).
122. See supra Section I.B.2.
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resources and incentives would have a marginal impact, at most, on these
shortcomings of patent examination. A complete evaluation of
patentability in examination, if even possible, would require fundamental
changes to the very nature and concept of ex ante patent examination.
A. The Structural Barriers to Complete Patent Examination
Even with greater time and resources allocated to patent examination,
examiners would still face several obstacles in carrying out their tasks.
These obstacles result from the structure of examination as an ex ante,
nonadversarial, noninquisitorial, and confidential proceeding.
1.

Examiners as database searchers, not investigators
Information gathering in patent examination is a document-focused,
desk-constrained, and database-driven process. After reading the patent
application to understand the invention, the examiner is instructed to
“search[] the prior art as disclosed in patents and other published
documents.”123 The examiner conducts this search for documents by
searching databases from his or her desk at the Patent Office in Arlington,
Virginia (or a regional office or, increasingly, the examiner’s home).124
Specifically, the examiner searches databases containing the full text
of United States patents and pending patent applications, as well as
abstracts of foreign patent applications.125 The examiner also is
instructed to search databases that might contain relevant nonpatent
documents, though such searches are often outsourced to search
specialists in the Patent Office’s Scientific and Technical Information
Center (STIC). STIC maintains a (largely electronic) library of
nonpatent literature that includes over 78,000 journals and 359,000
books in full text, though also including some conferences, standards,
and dissertations.126 STIC staff can also search commercial databases
and subscription resources, which can “provide access to non-patent
literature that is typically not available on the [i]nternet.”127

123. MPEP, supra note 57, § 904 (emphasis added).
124. Kieff, supra note 1, at 1948 (demonstrating that examiners conduct prior art
searches in databases from their desks).
125. MPEP, supra note 57, § 904.02.
126. Id. § 901.06(a)(IV)(B); Electronic Non-Patent Literature Available at the USPTO,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/support-centers/scientific-and-technical-information-centerstic/electronic [https://perma.cc/B2SV-RD4D].
127. MPEP, supra note 57, § 901.06(a)(IV)(B).
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The Patent Office lacks the “inquisitorial powers” necessary to
“compel the disclosure of pertinent facts” not found in the type of
formal documents collected and maintained in formal databases.128
The examiner can impose a requirement for information (or
interrogatories or requested stipulations) on the patent applicant,
seeking, for example, information about any prior art search
conducted by the applicant, relevant nonpatent literature in the
applicant’s possession, and real-world uses of the claimed invention
before the filing of the patent application.129 However, if information
is not found in a formal, searchable database and is not in the
applicant’s possession, the examiner has no way to find the
information. The examiner cannot issue subpoenas or send document
requests to third parties, conduct depositions of relevant witnesses,
hire investigators, or the like.
Thus, examination is noninvestigatory, with the examiners’ task
primarily to search for relevant documents in the available formal
databases. Overcoming this limitation would require a fundamental
shift of examination towards an investigatory model, not merely more
time and resources.
2.

The lack of a motivated adversary in examination
Patent examination is an ex parte, nonadversarial process between
just the patent examiner and the applicant without a third party that
actively opposes patent issuance.130 Statutory and regulatory provisions
expressly prohibit the participation of third parties in examination.131
The ex parte nature of patent examination is both a further obstacle

128. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314. An impractical and rarely used procedure
for the public before publication or an office action to initiate an evaluation of
patentability based on activity prior art was abolished in 2012. See U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 720 (8th ed., Aug. 2012 rev.),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/e8r9/mpep-0700.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FUK6-GBAQ].
129. 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2018); see also MPEP, supra note 57, § 704.10–14.
130. Wasserman, supra note 63, at 2014 (describing the patent examination process).
131. See MPEP, supra note 57, § 1901.07 (highlighting prohibition on further
participation by third parties who file pre-publication protests against a patent
application); MPEP, supra note 57, § 1134.01(II)(B)(3) (emphasizing that postpublication prior art submission procedures “should not be interpreted as permitting
a third party to participate in the prosecution of an application”).
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to information gathering in examination and undermines the ability
to accurately process the information that is available.
a. Ex parte examination and information gathering
Ex parte examination exacerbates the structural limits on
information gathering discussed above. Examination lacks a motivated
adversary that could offset the examiner’s lack of investigatory and
inquisitorial powers by, for example, conducting an investigation to
find and provide relevant information not found in formal databases
or the applicant’s possession.132 Examination relies on two mechanisms
to offset the informational gap caused by its nonadversarial nature, but
neither is particularly effective.
First, examination imposes a duty of disclosure on patent applicants.
Applicants have little inherent incentive to provide information to aid
the Patent Office’s examination because more information equates
with more prior art that could render the application unpatentable.133
However, Patent Office regulations impose a duty on the patent
applicant and its attorney to disclose information that “establishes, by
itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie case of
unpatentability of a claim” or refutes an applicant’s argument about
patentability.134 Still, applicants have no duty to search for prior art and
need only disclose information already in their possession.135 The costs
of prior art searching and the potential consequences of failing to
disclose relevant prior art that applicants find—unenforceability of
their patent through an inequitable conduct finding in litigation—
discourage most patent applicants from undertaking a prior art
search.136 Unsurprisingly, many patent applications have “a minimal
number of submitted references” from the applicant.137
Those applicant disclosures that do occur do little to remedy the
structural shortcomings of examination. Presumably, applicants
drafted their claims to maximize claim scope while avoiding the known

132. See Doug Lichtman & Mark. A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 54 (2007) (“Adversarial processes tend to produce good
evaluative information.”).
133. Cotropia, supra note 67, at 751–52 (characterizing the strategic reasons for
applicants to avoid providing patent quality information).
134. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a)–(b).
135. Thomas, supra note 128, at 314.
136. Cotropia, supra note 67, at 751–52; Thomas, supra note 128, at 314–15.
137. Thomas, supra note 128, at 314.
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prior art.138 Moreover, applicants who disclose prior art tend to submit
an overwhelming amount,139 probably due to some combination of the
difficulty evaluating the materiality of information, the threat of
inequitable conduct from nondisclosure, and the strategic incentive to
hide important prior art amongst lots of trivial references.140
Separating the useful from the useless disclosed information is nearly
impossible.141 And empirical evidence suggests that applicants even
“withhold between 21% and 33% of relevant citations known to them,”
as evidenced by prior art found and used by examiners that had been
cited in prior patents issued to the same applicant.142
Perhaps for all of these reasons, only 2% of prior art references
disclosed by applicants are used in unpatentability rejections, with 87%
of prior art used to reject claimed inventions coming from the examiner
and only 13% coming from applicant disclosures.143 To some extent, this
could be attributable to resource constraints, since examiners with more
time could more carefully sift through the material disclosed by the
applicant. But the self-interested way in which applicants approach their
duty of disclosure—submitting virtually nothing, trying to overwhelm the
examiner, and/or withholding key relevant documents—reflects the
inherent shortcomings of a nonadversarial process.
Second, although there historically was no public involvement in
examination whatsoever,144 two limited opportunities now exist for
third parties to submit information, though they may not participate
any further. First, a third party may submit a protest against a pending
patent application but is statutorily barred from doing so after the

138. See Deepak Hegde & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner Citations, Applicant Citations,
and the Private Value of Patents, 105 ECON. LETTERS 287, 289 (2009).
139. Thomas, supra note 128, at 314–15 (stating that providing an overwhelming
number of references may be an attempt to overload examiners facing time constraints).
140. Cotropia, supra note 67, at 767–69, 777–78 (discussing the various incentives
for both overcompliance and undercompliance); Thomas, supra note 128, at 315.
141. See Thomas, supra note 128, at 314–15 (blaming the inability to sort through
all the disclosed information on the Patent Office’s tight employee schedules).
142. Ryan Lampe, Strategic Citation, 94 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 320, 320 (2012); see
also Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Applicants Search for Prior Art, 53 J.L. & ECON. 399, 401
(2010) (“Applicants routinely fail to identify even their own previous patents . . . .”).
143. Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Applicant
Patent Citations Matter?, 42 RES. POL’Y 844, 847 (2013); see also id. at 851 (suggesting
resource constraints and/or cognitive biases are the most likely explanations).
144. Wagner, supra note 121, at 2161 (examining the traditionally secretiveness of
patent prosecution).
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patent application publishes (usually eighteen months after filing).145
The protest can be “based on any facts or information adverse to
patentability,” including prior art patents, patent applications, nonpatent
literature, and evidence of real-world activities related to the patentability
of the invention.146 It also must include a concise statement of the
relevance of the information submitted, which can include arguments
against patentability.147 Second, after publication, a means still exists
for third parties to submit prior art for consideration in examination,
though this action is more limited than prepublication oppositions.148
Post-publication third-party submissions are limited to prior art
patents, patent applications, and printed publications and exclude
nondocumentary evidence.149 They also permit concise statements as
to the relevance of the documents submitted but prohibit arguments
related to patentability.150
Although these third-party participation procedures seem like
promising ways to address the nonadversarial nature of examination, they
“are rarely used.”151 The confidentiality of patent examination severely
limits their effectiveness, as discussed further below.152 Moreover, given the
sheer volume of patenting activity and the difficulty in ascertaining claim
scope, competitors in many industries do not have incentives to even
monitor each other’s patent applications,153 much less submit prior art.154
And in some cases, a competitor may not even exist at the time of
examination because the patent application relates to a new technology for
which a market has not yet developed.155
Even when aware of applications, competitors may not find a prior
art search or submission cost-justified, given uncertainty in claim scope

145. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2012) (establishing appropriate protest procedures); 37
C.F.R. § 1.291 (2018) (outlining specific protest requirements).
146. MPEP, supra note 57, § 1901.02.
147. 37 C.F.R. § 1.291(c)(2) (identifying a concise explanation of relevance as a
protest requirement); MPEP, supra note 57, § 1134.
148. 35 U.S.C. § 122(e) (listing procedures for third party inquiries).
149. Id. (describing preissuance submission by third parties); MPEP, supra note 57, § 1134.
150. MPEP, supra note 57, § 1134.01(II)(B)(2).
151. Cotropia, supra note 67, at 732 & n.39.
152. See infra Section II.A.3.
153. See Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 302, 307 (2012).
154. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 132, at 55.
155. Id.
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and the relevance of the application to their business.156 This is
particularly true given that a third party’s participation in examination
ends with the submission of prior art, and there is no opportunity to
provide the further arguments, explanations, and response to the
applicant’s arguments that might be necessary to establish
unpatentability and prevent patent issuance.157 And competitors who are
aware of the patent application and have their own prior art readily at
hand have incentives to withhold it for their private use if the patent is
asserted against them, rather than identifying themselves as a target for
litigation158 or creating a public good that benefits other competitors
by preventing the patent from issuing.159
b. Ex parte examination and information processing
The nonadversarial nature of patent examination also hinders the
processing of that information which is available in examination. The
patent applicant is highly motivated to obtain patent issuance, whereas
the patent examiner is neutral and without any particular incentive to
reject a patent application. Thus, “[p]atent examination is in many ways
steered by the patent applicant.”160 The patent applicant’s incentive is
“to reframe the issue, rebut the evidence, and otherwise put its own spin
on the information” in a way that favors patentability.161 Without an
opposing party arguing for the opposite result or providing an
alternative view of the evidence and issues, examiners must identify
weaknesses and counterarguments themselves.162 “[N]o matter how
good the examiner, no examiner will ever know as much or be as
motivated as a true market rival.”163
Thus, without a motivated adversary to push back, applicants “will take
advantage of [any] wiggle room in the conceptual space between a prior
art reference and the claims of a patent” to avoid unpatentability.164 Left
156. See id. (noting the burden of monitoring and participating in examination, especially
in industries where commercial products could potentially implicate a large number of patents).
157. MPEP, supra note 57, §§ 1134(V), 1901.07.
158. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 132, at 55.
159. Cotropia, supra note 67, at 752–53; Thomas, supra note 128, at 333.
160. Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 965 (2004).
161. Id.
162. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 132, at 54.
163. Id. at 54–55.
164. Farrell & Merges, supra note 160, at 966.
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with only the examiner’s own limited understanding of the prior art and
claimed invention165 and “the patentee’s characterization and spin,”166
the ex parte structure of patent examination makes it difficult for the
examiner to fully appreciate the significance for patentability of even
those prior art references that it can plausibly search and identify,
regardless of resources or time allotted.167
3.

The confidentiality of patent examination
By statute, patent applications are confidential and patent
examination is a secretive process until the patent application publishes,
typically eighteen months after filing.168 This confidentiality hinders
patent examination in at least three distinct ways.
First, because unpublished patent applications are confidential, they
are not available as prior art references during examination of other
patent applications.169 Patent examiners have access to unpublished
patent applications but cannot use them as prior art until they are
published or issued.170 Yet, a U.S. patent application that later
publishes or issues is prior art from the date it is filed, even if not
publicly available at that time.171 The patentability of a claimed
invention therefore can change based on what happens in prosecution
with another patent. If Patents A and B cover the same claimed
invention and Patent A was filed before Patent B’s filing date but not yet
published or issued, Patent B would be patentable at the time it was filed
and would stay patentable, and even issue, unless Patent A was published
or issued. But as soon as Patent A is published or issued, Patent B would
suddenly become unpatentable because it was anticipated by Patent A.
Thus, the Patent Office cannot rely on unpublished patent applications
even though those applications are prior art for anticipation and
obviousness purposes as soon as they are published.
Second, the confidentiality of patent examination severely
undermines the effectiveness of the third-party prior art submission
procedures. Since protests are prohibited once the patent application
165. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 132, at 53.
166. Farrell & Merges, supra note 160, at 966.
167. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 132, at 54 (lamenting the lack of a
“competitive dynamic” and “[a]dversarial processes” in examination that produces
“good evaluative information”).
168. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012).
169. MPEP, supra note 57, § 901.03.
170. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 865–66 & n.113.
171. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2).
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is published and becomes publicly available,172 protests depend on the
happenstance that a third party has somehow obtained independent
knowledge of the confidential patent application. And, practically,
post-publication third-party prior art submissions must occur within a
short window between when the application becomes public after
eighteen months and a statutorily imposed deadline of the later
between six months after publication and the examiner’s first rejection
of the application.173 This short, six-month timeframe resulting from
the pre-publication secrecy of patent examination exacerbates the
difficulties and disincentives for competitors in submitting prior art.174
Finally, “[t]he [i]nternet is an Office-approved search tool” and
could help identify information not collected in formal databases.175
However, the internet’s effectiveness as a means of gathering
information is severely undermined by the confidentiality of
examination. Because “[t]he [i]nternet is generally a public forum and
most communications made over the [i]nternet are neither confidential
nor secure,” patent examiners are prohibited from conducting internet
searches that “could disclose proprietary information directed to a
specific application which has not been published” and limited to
internet searches while the application is unpublished for “the general
state of the art and formulated in such a way that protects the
confidential proprietary intellectual property.”176 This confidentiality
restriction makes the internet an ineffective information source, at
least during the early part of examination when the examiner is
typically gathering information.177
4.

The language limitations of examination
Patent examination occurs in English. But the relevant information
(i.e., prior art) for patent examination can come from anywhere in the
world and therefore be in any language.178 The Patent Office’s STIC
offers oral, machine, and written translation services for “foreign
document sources that may be possible references for applications

172. § 122(c).
173. § 122(e).
174. See supra Section II.A.2.a.
175. MPEP, supra note 57, § 904.02(c).
176. Id.
177. See id. § 904 (noting that “[f]ollowing the first Office action, the examiner need
not ordinarily make a second search of the prior art”).
178. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
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being examined.”179 But these translation services have limits. Oral
translations are limited to the major European languages and
Japanese, while written translations are limited to those materials
“being considered for citation or already cited in applications.”180
More generally, the disconnect between the language breadth of
prior art and the language abilities of the examining corps makes the
translation issue somewhat circular. Translations are available for
“possible references” and material “being considered for citation,”181
but, often, examiners will be unable to know whether a foreign-language
document is a possible reference or should be considered for citation
because they cannot understand the disclosure of that document.
5.

The lack of referents for claim scope in examination
Patent rights are defined by the scope of the claims, not the technical
disclosure of the invention in the specification.182 “Frequently, a claim
includes within its breadth or scope one or more variant embodiments
that are not disclosed in the application, but which would anticipate
[or render obvious] the claimed invention if found in a reference.”183
The Patent Office instructs its examiners to identify the full potential
scope of the claim beyond merely the specification’s description of the
invention.184 In fact, claims in examination are supposed to be given
their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the rest of the
patent to ensure that the Patent Office has considered and found
patentable the full potential breadth that the claim could later be given.185
But discerning the full potential scope of the claim is nearly impossible
in examination. Examiners have some specialized training in the general
field of the invention but only a limited understanding of the specific
invention at issue,186 which (in theory) should be new and sufficiently
different than what previously existed. Applicants typically encourage a
narrow understanding of claim scope in examination to increase the
chances of patentability,187 and ex parte examination lacks a motivated
179. MPEP, supra note 57, § 901.06(a)(IV)(D).
180. Id. § 901.05(d).
181. Id. § 901.06(a)(IV)(D).
182. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
183. MPEP, supra note 57, § 904.01(a).
184. Id.
185. Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent
Office’s “Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 285, 291 (2009).
186. See Cotropia, supra note 67, at 754–55.
187. Wagner, supra note 121, at 2149–50.

1126

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1095

adversary to counter the narrow understanding advanced by the applicant
and push the boundaries of the claimed invention.188
With the disclosure of the specification as the only point of reference
and “without a particular ‘targeted’ good or service in hand” to offer
another and broader potential understanding, the examiner naturally
will read the claim in light of the disclosed embodiments and struggle
to recognize other implementations that might still fall within the
claim scope.189 Notably, the Patent Office does not provide any
particular guidance to examiners on how to discern the broadest
reasonable interpretation.190 Examination thus inevitably focuses on
the patentability of the scope of the invention disclosed in the
specification, even though the patent’s exclusive rights extend beyond
the scope of the disclosed embodiments to the full scope of the claim
language. For example, if the claim recites a “binding” connecting two
pieces and all of the examples in the specification and prior art relate
to snaps, screws, bolts, and other such devices, the examiner will tend
to understand the “binding” as referring to a piece of hardware that
serves as a fastener and have trouble recognizing that it could include
adhesive substances like glue.
6.

The snapshot nature of patent examination
Examination is only capable of providing a partial evaluation of
patentability from a temporal perspective. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom that patentability is static and a claimed invention either always
satisfied the statutory criteria or never did,191 the patentability of a claimed
invention can change over a patent’s two-decade life. Thus, a claimed
invention patentable at issuance may subsequently become unpatentable.
Most obviously, a claimed invention may be properly found
patentable by the Patent Office in examination but subsequently
become unpatentable because the statutory criteria of patentability
changed. Although patent law is a statutory field, the statutory criteria
188. See Cotropia, supra note 67, at 732 (describing the nonadversarial nature of
examination).
189. Wagner, supra note 121, at 2147; see also Janet Freilich, The Uninformed
Topography of Patent Scope, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 150, 167–72, 187–88 (2015)
(explaining that the only information available to reliably determine claim scope in ex
ante examination is the disclosure in the specification and the prior art).
190. See Bey & Cotropia, supra note 185, at 309–10 (explaining that Patent Office
guidance reflects only general claim construction applicable to litigation without
explaining how to use these tools to identify the broadest reasonable interpretation).
191. See supra Section I.B.
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of patentability are written in broad, open-ended terms and developed
primarily through case-by-case judicial decisions.192 Thus, “[p]atent
law . . . is not fixed in place. It is continually in flux, occasionally
because of changes enacted by Congress, but more frequently because
of judicial changes to the common law of patents.”193 Although patent
law always has been subject to change,194 the changes have been
particularly frequent and pronounced in the twenty-first century.195
Importantly, judicial changes to the statutory criteria of patentability
are applied retroactively to previously issued patents.196
“[A]s the legal standards for patentability change—as many have in
recent years—inventions that were once subject to a valid patent are
no longer worthy of protection.”197 Patent examination can only
provide a snapshot evaluation of the patentability of a claimed
invention as the statutory conditions of patentability exist at the time
of examination; it offers no insight into the patentability of the
invention in light of subsequent changes to the statutory conditions.
Perhaps less obviously, the claimed invention itself can change over
time. Patents are often assumed in popular conception and even in
patent law doctrine and theory to provide exclusive rights to a distinct,
concrete invention, often thought of in physical terms.198 This assumed
concrete, even physical, patented invention necessarily remains
constant over time.199 Thus, patent rights are typically assumed to be
“fixed at the moment the patent issues” and to remain “unchanging”

192. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51,
53 (2010).
193. Jonathan S. Masur & Adam K. Mortara, Patents, Property, and Prospectivity, 71
STAN. L. REV. 963, 971 (2019); see also David L. Schwartz, Retroactivity at the Federal
Circuit, 89 IND. L.J. 1547, 1548 (2014) (noting that the Federal Circuit frequently makes
rulings “that substantially alter the value of previously issued patents”).
194. Nard, supra note 192, at 55.
195. See Masur & Mortara, supra note 193, at 971–72 (contending that many Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit cases since 2005 “have revised the law in significant ways”).
196. Id. at 995–97; see also Schwartz, supra note 193, at 1548–49.
197. La Belle, supra note 1, at 1883.
198. See Rantanen, supra note 25, at 902 (describing the idea of “[t]he invention as
a thing, a rem” as a historical foundation of the patent system and patent statutes); id.
at 903 (describing the typical understanding of a patent as covering a “stationary
construct; it is the very thing that the patent holder is allowed to stop others from
using”); id. at 919–20 (describing the conventional “assumption that patent rights are
rights over a discrete unit of technology”).
199. Id. at 900–06.
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and “immutable” over the life of the patent.200 Yet, bedrock patent law
holds that the claim language, not the inventor’s physical embodiment
of the invention, defines the inventor’s exclusive rights.201 The claimed
invention is whatever is encompassed within the claim language,202 and
“the invention itself has no substantive existence other than as a
shorthand for the subject matter that a patentee can claim.”203
Defining the patented invention based on the claim language allows
it to change over time. As recognized by Jason Rantanen, “patent rights
are malleable . . . . [T]heir scope and strength can be altered by actors
interacting with those rights even after the government has issued that
right.”204 In theory, patent claims are a fence demarcating and
providing notice of the patent owner’s exclusive rights, but, in reality,
they lack the clarity, certainty, and objectivity of a fence.205 Applicants
face a notoriously difficult task in translating an invention that exists
in the inventor’s mind into words that define the full scope of the
invention but nothing more.206 They also have an incentive to use broad,
vague, and ambiguous language to maintain flexibility in light of
unknown prior art and future market and technological
developments.207 Nor, as previously noted, is claim scope constrained by
the description or embodiments in the patent document.208 Because the
scope of the claimed invention can stretch and contract over time,
Patent Office examination only provides a snapshot evaluation of the
patentability of the claimed invention as it exists at one point in time.209
Perhaps this is just a variation of the lack of referents problem, with
the examiner lacking the referents to envision the outer limits to which
200. Id.
201. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also
Freilich, supra note 189, at 156 (“[P]atent grants typically extend somewhat beyond
the physical invention created by the patentee.”).
202. Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 8–10 (2012).
203. Id. at 7.
204. Rantanen, supra note 25, at 919.
205. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1747–49 (2009).
206. Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396–97 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
207. See Rantanen, supra note 25, at 941; Risch, supra note 32, at 188; Wagner, supra
note 121, at 2149; Yelderman, supra note 85, at 97–102.
208. See supra Section II.B.
209. Although the broadest reasonable interpretation standard used in
examination should force the Patent Office to consider the full potential claim scope,
its effectiveness is doubtful. See supra Section II.B.
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claim scope can be stretched over the life of the patent. However, it is
probably better seen as a distinct, but overlapping issue. Even if the
examiner had sufficient referents to perfectly understand the claim at
the time of examination, the scope can still expand in the future in a
way that the examiner could not predict in examination. New
technology might be developed that is different from that which
existed at examination but arguably falls within the claim scope210—for
example, the invention of Velcro after the issuance of a claim to a
“binding” between two pieces. Or the patentee might attempt to alter
the claim meaning from how it would have been understood in
examination to cover a competitor’s product. For example, assume a
claim referred to a “fastener” between two pieces and a perfect
understanding of the claim in examination would have covered all
hardware devices capable of connecting two pieces, but not adhesive
substances like glue. If a competitor introduces a product using an
adhesive substance rather than a hardware piece, the patent owner has
a strong incentive to attempt to reimagine the meaning of “fastener”
to cover adhesive substances. While there is no guarantee that the
patent owner will be able to do so, the vague language of claims,
flexible tools of claim construction, and uncertainty in the rules of
claim construction make it a realistic possibility.211
B. Examination of Only Some Categories of Prior Art
The Patent Office insists that patent examination is most effective
when “the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all
information material to patentability.”212 In reality, patent examination
evaluates only some types of the wide swath of information that
qualifies as prior art. Scholars have recognized, at least in passing, that
patent examiners face information shortages,213 with particular

210. See Freilich, supra note 189, at 156 (“[T]here is no basis in current knowledge
to predict the scope of the claimed invention, because parts of the claimed invention
do not yet exist.”).
211. See Rantanen, supra note 25, at 928–42.
212. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2018).
213. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 67, at 749–50 (“[T]he [Patent Office] does not have
access to adequate information to correctly determine whether a claimed invention is novel
and nonobvious.”); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 132, at 46 (“Information is a second
significant impediment to PTO review.”); Wagner, supra note 121, at 2139 (“The patentprosecution process is fraught with serious information problems . . . .”).
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difficulty finding prior art other than U.S. patents.214 Anecdotal
evidence indicates that patent examination is overwhelmingly focused
on U.S. patent prior art.215 Empirical evidence seems to bear this out. U.S.
patents comprise 63.5% of all prior art cited in examination by either the
applicant or examiner, with nonpatent publications comprising 22% and
foreign patents comprising 14%.216 The prior art used in rejecting patent
applications is even more heavily skewed towards U.S. patents.217 Indeed,
only 3.6% of prior art cited by the examiner is nonpatent publications
and less than 15% of granted patents had any nonpatent literature cited
by the examiner.218
Scholars typically blame this U.S. patent-centric focus on the wellrecognized time and resource constraints of examination.219 This is
undoubtedly part of the explanation—searching U.S. patents is
generally quicker and easier than finding other types of prior art.220
Aside from sheer volume, prior art U.S. patents are comparatively easy
to identify since they are written in English, classified by technology
area, and contained in a single, centralized, and text-searchable

214. See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 67, at 753–54 (describing patent examiners as
limited to “search[ing] world-wide patent databases and some technical article
databases”); Ford, supra note 1, at 838–39 (noting that patent examiners “have limited
ability to search nonpatent prior art”); Rantanen, supra note 25, at 911–12 (describing
“searches for nonpatent prior art” as being “more challenging” for patent examiners).
215. See Thomas, supra note 128, at 318 (“Persistent commentary also reports that
the Patent Office has increasingly relied upon previously issued patents as prior art.
Newly granted patents stress the citation of prior art patents, with diminished
reference to such secondary literature as texts and journal articles.”).
216. Cotropia et al., supra note 143, at 846–48.
217. Id. at 846–47 (finding that examiner-cited prior art is the primary basis for
rejections and is heavily skewed towards U.S. patents).
218. Chien, supra note 109, at 118.
219. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 1, at 853–54 (describing examination searches as
“necessarily more cursory” than in litigation because “examiners have far less time”);
Ryan Lampe, Strategic Citation, 94 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 320, 320 (2012) (concluding
that “patent examiners are too resource constrained to conduct thorough searches”);
Sampat, supra note 142, at 399 (noting that “resource-constrained examiners face
difficulties in identifying relevant prior arts”); Thomas, supra note 128, at 318 (“Tight
examiner schedules appear to be the chief cause of this circumscribed searching
strategy.”); Wagner, supra note 121, at 2139 (attributing the “serious information
problems” in patent examination to “an over-taxed administrative agency”).
220. See Thomas, supra note 128, at 318 (“In comparison to much of the secondary
literature, patents are readily accessible, conveniently classified and printed in a
common format. Identification of a promising secondary reference, and full
comprehension of its contents, often prove to be more difficult tasks.”).
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database.221 More time and resources could give examiners a greater
opportunity to search and find other categories of prior art, such as
formal publications. Studies have shown that European patent
examiners, who have much more time than American counterparts,
cite nonpatent publications at much higher rates.222
Even with greater time and resources, however, the structural
limitations of examination would still prevent effective examination of
significant categories of prior art. Put differently, even with optimal
time and resources, examination is only structured to be able to
provide systematic, comprehensive, and effective examination of the
patentability of a claimed invention against certain types of prior art,
specifically, U.S. patents, formal publications, and maybe foreign
patents. Unpublished patent applications, real-world activities, and
informal publications cannot effectively be evaluated ex ante in
examination and appear in examination, if at all, by happenstance.
1.

The nonexamination of unpublished patent applications
Most clearly, the pre-publication confidentiality of patent examination
means that other unpublished patent applications cannot affect the
patentability of a claimed invention during examinations, even though such
unpublished applications can render the claimed invention unpatentable as
anticipated or obvious as soon as they are published or issued.223
2.

The nonexamination of activities prior art
Examiners generally cannot find information unless it is documentary
evidence capable of being searched via databases from their desk.224 Yet,
prior art extends beyond that which has been formally documented to
include real-world activities, in particular, sales and uses of the
invention.225 Even a single sale of the claimed invention can constitute
invalidating prior art, whether done by the inventor or third parties.226
Moreover, sale prior art is invalidating if there is a commercial offer for
sale of an invention that is ready for patenting, regardless of whether the

221. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 865.
222. See Chien, supra note 109, at 117–18 (finding that approximately 20% of
European examiner citations are to nonpatent publications).
223. See supra Section II.A.3; MPEP, supra note 57, § 901.03.
224. See supra Section II.A.1.
225. See Thomas, supra note 128, at 313 (“Other permissible sources of prior art,
such as sales offers or knowledge, need not have been formally documented at al1.”).
226. See CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02[6] (summarizing cases for sales).
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sale makes the invention available to the public.227 Thus, the claimed
invention need not be for-sale to the general public or end users, but
rather can be the subject of a single sale among businesses in the supply
chain.228 And even “secret sales” that are not publicized or are subject to
confidentiality obligations among the parties qualify as invalidating prior
art.229 Likewise, “[i]t is clear from the pertinent Supreme Court decisions
that very little use and very little publicity are required to constitute a
public use.”230 A single use of the invention for its intended purpose by
someone with no limitation, restriction, or obligation of secrecy to the
inventor constitutes public use prior art.231 The use is a public use if
the invention was used in its natural and intended way, even if the public
generally could not see the invention in operation, for example, because
the invention was hidden within a larger product or was commercially
exploited in a factory not open to the public.232
These prior art activities—prior uses and sales of the invention—are
essentially not a part of patent examination.233 Sales and public uses
typically are not formally documented in the type of publicly accessible
publications or databases that a noninvestigatory examiner can find via
database searching.234 These activities generally occur in the commercial
sector, not the scientific research community, and the commercial sector
does not share the scientific community’s emphasis on disclosure and
dissemination of information.235 For example, “[i]nternal developments
at a competitor firm can manifest themselves in a number of types of
prior art” that “no amount of pre-filing search could have turned up.”236
Even when a documentary trail exists for prior art uses or sales—sales
227. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 633 (2019).
228. See id. at 628 (sale from manufacturer to U.S. marketing and distribution
partner constituted invalidating prior sale); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60–
69 (1998) (sale from manufacturer of component part to manufacturer of end
consumer product found to be invalidating prior sale).
229. Helsinn, 139 S. Ct. at 633.
230. CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 226, § 6.02[5].
231. Id.
232. See id. § 6.02[5][a]–[b] (summarizing cases).
233. See Risch, supra note 32, at 196 (“[E]xaminers limit their searches to printed
publications only.”).
234. See Cotropia et al., supra note 143, at 845 (noting that “prior sales and public
uses do not show up in publications, and are accordingly unlikely to be found by patent
examiners”); Lemley, supra note 22, at 1500.
235. See Thomas, supra note 128, at 319 (making this point in the context of business
method patents).
236. Merges, supra note 32, at 599.
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brochures, order forms, press releases, newspaper accounts, or the like—it
may not appear in the formal databases searched by the examiner. The
confidentiality of patent examination further limits the examiner’s ability to
find any documentary trail that might be on the internet.237
Reflecting these structural shortcomings, the Patent Office does not
even instruct examiners to search for prior uses and sales in the prior
art it instructs examiners to search.238 Activity prior art (i.e., sales and
uses) can only be submitted by third parties via the exceedingly rare prepublication protests, not post-publication submission procedures.239
Thus, activity prior art will only be a part of an examination if it is
submitted by the applicant,240 an unlikely possibility for reasons discussed
above. Thus, activity prior art is functionally not a part of ex ante patent
examination in the Patent Office. Unsurprisingly, researchers exclude
activities when studying the prior art used in patent examination.241
3.

The practical nonexamination of informal publications
Prior art includes nonpatent publications like books, scientific journals,
and other formal publications likely to appear in searchable databases.242
But it extends beyond such formal documents to include any paper or
electronic document that is sufficiently accessible to those interested in
the field, with a focus on dissemination and public accessibility.243 Trade
publications, conference papers, sales catalogs, nonconfidential
government and industry reports, product manuals, grant proposals and
applications, and conference “poster” presentations can be printed
publications.244 “[A] single cataloged thesis in one university library”
counts as a printed publication, provided it is indexed by subject matter.245
Printed publications also can come from the internet, including online

237. See supra Section II.A.3.
238. See MPEP, supra note 57, § 904.02 (instructing examiners to search “three
reference sources . . . domestic patents (including patent application publications),
foreign patent documents, and nonpatent literature (NPL)”).
239. See supra Section II.A.2.a.
240. See Cotropia et al., supra note 143, at 845 (suggesting that prior sales and public
uses are “more likely to be in the possession of applicants”).
241. See id. at 846 n.3 (excluding “applicant information outside of references, like
prior sales, public uses, etc.”).
242. See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 226, § 3.04[2] (discussing what sources may
constitute “prior art”).
243. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004); MPEP, supra note 57, § 2128.
244. See CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 226, § 3.04[2] (summarizing cases).
245. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

1134

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1095

databases, web pages, discussion groups, and social media posts.246 The
Federal Circuit even has suggested that a public billboard on display for
months “most surely” would be a printed publication.247 A document
can be a printed publication even if not widely distributed or
distributed at all.248 Nor does a document even have to be viewed by
anyone, provided it was sufficiently publicly accessible that a person
interested in the field could have come across it.249 And, again, these
obscure printed publications can come from anywhere in the world.250
Unlike unpublished applications and activities, patent examiners are
officially instructed to search and rely on nonpatent printed
publications.251 Yet, commentators have widely recognized that examiners
encounter substantial problems searching nonpatent literature252 and
rarely rely on nonpatent literature of any type, much less informal
publications not collected in databases.253
Traditional publications, like books and journals, seem suitable for
examiner search during patent examination. They are publicly
available in the type of libraries and databases to which examiners have
access, are frequently catalogued by topic, and can be text-searchable.
Traditional publications may be more difficult to search and find than
U.S. patents because they do not follow the established classification
system and are often not in the same centralized database.254 Yet, with
enough time and resources, examiners seem capable of finding
relevant traditional publications. Thus, the absence of traditional

246. MPEP, supra note 57, § 2128(II)(A).
247. Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1348.
248. See id. at 1349–52 (noting that a conference paper with six distributed copies
and an oral presentation to 500 people qualified as a printed publication and finding
a poster presentation displayed for a total of three days at another conference, without
any distribution of copies, qualified as a printed publication).
249. Id. at 1350.
250. See Thomas, supra note 128, at 313 (“Every book, journal article, leaflet, and student
thesis published anywhere in the world in any language potentially serves as prior art.”).
251. MPEP, supra note 57, § 904.02.
252. See infra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
253. See Chien, supra note 109, at 117–18 (providing data that less than 15% of all U.S.
patent grants have any nonpatent literature cited by the examiner and nonpatent literature
comprises less than 5% of all prior art cited by examiners for granted U.S. patents).
254. See Rantanen, supra note 25, at 911–12 (noting examiners difficulty searching
for nonpatent prior art).
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publications in examination seems best attributable to Patent Office
resource constraints and rational ignorance.255
The conclusion is different for nontraditional publications. Most of
the wide swath of documents other than traditional books and journals
that qualify as printed publications are not catalogued and kept in
libraries or centralized databases that are capable of being found by an
examiners searching from their computers.256 Some of these documents
might be discoverable via internet searching, but, again, the
confidentiality of pre-publication examination limits the examiner’s
ability to conduct effective searches. And the Patent Office lacks the
inquisitorial powers—the ability to hire investigators, to subpoena
witnesses, to take depositions, to make document requests, etc.—
needed to find these nontraditional publications, such as a PhD thesis
in a single library, sales brochures, academic conference poster
presentations, trade show flyers, and the like.257 Nor is there a motivated
adversary, with the tools of litigation discovery and the incentive to invest in
finding such documents, to supplement the examiner’s shortcomings.
Patent examination, even with greater time and resources, is simply
not structured to find nontraditional publications. The discovery of these
documents would be pure happenstance, perhaps because the applicant
knew of the document and disclosed it,258 the examiner accidentally
stumbled across it, or it was one of the exceedingly rare occasions where
third-party prior art submission procedures were used. However, the Patent

255. See Chien, supra note 109, at 120, 122 (suggesting that greater use of nonpatent
literature by European patent examiners is due to their greater time for examination).
256. See Cotropia, supra note 67, at 753–54 (“Patent examiners . . . do not have ready
access to all technical literature, such as specialized industry publications or
dissertations . . . .”); Yelderman, supra note 33, at 865 (noting that “[l]ibraries, after
all, do not typically maintain collections of product manuals, brochures, and
catalogs”); id. at 865 n.103 (noting that obtaining some documents like product
manuals requires purchasing a larger product).
257. See Kieff, supra note 1, at 1948 (“[N]o realistically available amount of time,
training, and access to commercial databases will help an examiner at her desk obtain
an obscure student thesis on the bookshelf of a foreign library or a specific laboratory
notebook corroborating the work of an individual researcher.”); Yelderman, supra
note 33, at 880 (“[N]othing short of imaginary reform to the PTO would suddenly
permit examiners to travel to the trade shows, conferences, or far-flung locales where
activities and nontraditional publications might be found.”).
258. See Colleen V. Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots the USPTO Could Try, 104 IOWA L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 12 (2019) (showing that applicants cite nonpatent literature much more
frequently than examiners rely on it in cases where the patent is later invalidated in
inter partes review).
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Office does not, and structurally cannot, systematically evaluate the
patentability of applications against nontraditional publications.
4.

The questionable examination of foreign language prior art
Prior art includes foreign patents issued from the over one million
patent applications filed each year in the over 150 patent offices across the
world.259 It also includes formal and informal publications from anywhere
in the world. These sources of prior art share similarities to their American
counterparts, though with some additional complications. Foreign patents
are not as easy to search as American patents because they are not in a single
database, and countries vary greatly on the ease of searching their
patents.260 Foreign formal publications are probably somewhat less likely
than American formal publications to appear in examiner databases. And
foreign informal publications involve all of the structural problems faced
by American informal publications and are probably even less likely to
come to the attention of the examiner by chance.
More significantly, foreign prior art implicates an additional structural
limitation of examination—the disconnect between English-language
examination and the global scope of prior art. Devoting more time and
resources to examination could make translations more freely available.
However, widely available translation services still depend on the
examiner’s being able to identify the relevance of a prior art source.
Examiners may sometimes have the language ability to do so or be able to
identify relevance from figures, diagrams, and the like. And in some wellidentified and narrow fields, the mere fact of publication in a particular
source or identification as part of a particular technology classification
may be a sufficient indicator of relevance. Often, however, the examiner’s
recognition of the relevance of a foreign language publication will just be
a matter of happenstance. Thus, while foreign language prior art can be
the subject of ex ante patent examination, the structure of patent
examination makes a systematic and comprehensive examination of

259. See The PCT Now Has 153 Contracting States, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/pct_contracting_states.html [https://perma.cc/FE4YMDDC] (identifying 153 signatories to the Patent Cooperation Treaty for patent filing
and examination); see also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INDICATORS 2017 29 (2017), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/
en/wipo_pub_941_2017-chapter2.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB8C-7RX2] (noting that
more than three million patent applications were filed worldwide in 2016).
260. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 873–74.
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foreign language prior art impossible, even if more resources and time
were dedicated to examination.
C. Examination of Only Partial Claim Scope
Ex ante examination also is structurally limited to evaluating the
patentability of only a portion of the patent applicant’s claimed rights.
The result is that patent owners’ exclusive rights will often reach into
space that the Patent Office has not reviewed or determined meets the
statutory criteria of patentability.
First, examination is not suited to discerning the outer limits of the
claim scope, even as those limits existed at the time of examination,
because of the lack of referents beyond the embodiments disclosed in
the specification and the lack of a motivated adversary to mitigate the
effects of the examiner’s restricted imagination and the applicant’s
incentive to push a narrow understanding of the claim.261 The examiner’s
inability to evaluate the full claim scope undermines examination of the
prior art requirements of anticipation and obviousness. The broader the
claim scope, the more prior art that is implicated and the more likely that
the claimed invention will be found anticipated or obvious. Because ex
ante examination is ill-suited for discerning the full claim scope, it is
only capable of determining that a subset of the claimed rights is
patentable over the prior art. And this determination is an unreliable
proxy for the patentability of the outer limits of claim scope
(undiscernible in examination) over the prior art.
The inability to identify the full claim scope in examination is not just a
problem for the prior art-based patentability requirements but also the
disclosure requirements of enablement and written description.262
Enablement and written description seek to ensure that the patent owner’s
claimed rights are commensurate with the technological contribution
disclosed in the specification. The narrower the claim scope, the more
likely the technological disclosure in the specification will be found to satisfy
the enablement and written description requirements. Examiners’ inability
to appreciate the full claim scope in examination will cause them to find
the claimed invention enabled and adequately described even where the
full claim scope extends beyond the technological disclosure. Indeed, the
261. See supra Sections II.A.2, II.A.5.
262. Similar issues probably exist for the indefiniteness doctrine, which requires
that the full claim scope be reasonably clear to a skilled person in the field. If the
examiner cannot appreciate the full claim scope, the examiner will be unable to
determine whether it would be reasonably clear to a skilled person.
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fact that the examiner will often understand claim scope based on the
embodiments disclosed in the specification, its only real point of reference,
will tend to prevent the examiner from recognizing any conceptual gap
between the patent claims and the technological disclosure that gives rise to
an enablement or written description problem.
Second, the malleability of patent claims further complicates the
ability of the examiner to evaluate patentability of the full set of
claimed rights conveyed by the patent. The malleability of patent
claims could be two-directional263—with claims either expanded or
narrowed—but tends to be used to broaden claim scope over time.264
Post-issuance, the technology and market will have developed in a way
that brings new points of references—competitor’s products and
advances—against which claim scope must be evaluated.265 These new
points of reference expand the perspective of a decision maker about the
claim language and provide examples of ways to understand the claim
language that go beyond the disclosure in the specification.266 This tends
to result in a broader understanding of the claimed invention.
Moreover, post-issuance, the patent owner’s incentive generally is to
try to expand claim scope to bring more products, including market
and technological developments unforeseen at issuance, within its
exclusive control,267 increasing the value of the patent.268 This
expanded scope comes, in theory, with an increased risk of invalidity269
but the presumption of validity, as well as the cost and risk required to

263. Rantanen, supra note 25, at 949.
264. See Wagner, supra note 121, at 2149 (noting that patent owners exploit
weaknesses in claiming to obtain a patent based on a narrow understanding “and later
assert that same patent in a way that broadens the scope of coverage”).
265. See Freilich, supra note 189, at 153 (noting that determining patent scope is
“an attempt to predict the shape of downstream innovation”); see also Wagner, supra
note 121, at 2147–48.
266. See Freilich, supra note 189, at 164 (noting that “[o]ver the years of the patent’s
life, competitors may develop inventions falling into the scope of the patent that were
not imagined by the patentee during prosecution of the patent” and can only be
accounted for in ex post adjudication).
267. See Wagner, supra note 121, at 2148 (noting the difficulty for patent drafters in
predicting the future of the technology and market).
268. See Freilich, supra note 189, at 153 (describing broad claim scope as “a windfall
to the patent owner”); see also Rantanen, supra note 34, at 12 (concluding that due to
claim malleability “only a portion of the enforced scope of patent rights may reflect
the inventor’s actual contribution”).
269. Rantanen, supra note 25, at 943.
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invalidate a patent, mitigate this risk.270 Traditionally, the accused
infringer had a countervailing incentive to exploit the malleability of
claims to try to shrink the claim’s scope and escape infringement.271
This was especially likely since accused infringers tended to prefer
noninfringement defenses (which benefit from narrower scope) to
invalidity defenses (which benefit from broader scope).272 However,
the recently expanded Patent Office cancellation proceedings only
consider invalidity, not infringement, and are efficient and effective
ways to invalidate a patent and thereby end an infringement suit.273 As
a result, accused infringers may now have incentives to use the
malleability of patent claims to expand their scope and make them
more vulnerable in these proceedings.274
In sum, the malleability of patent claims means that the claim scope
that defines the claimed invention can change over time and, for
various reasons, is likely to expand over time.275 Once again, the
narrower claimed invention in examination is more likely than the
subsequently expanded claimed invention ex post to meet the
statutory criteria of patentability, both the prior art requirements of
anticipation and nonobviousness and the disclosure requirements of
enablement, written description, and claim definiteness. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, then, the Patent Office may have properly issued
a patent as the claimed invention was then understood even though
the patent is later invalidated based on an expanded understanding of
the claimed invention.
D. Examination of Only Current Patentability Doctrines
Finally, ex ante patent examination is only capable of evaluating the
patentability of a claimed invention under the law as it exists at the
time of examination. Post-issuance judicial changes could lower the
bar of patentability and make it easier for a claimed invention to satisfy

270. See La Belle, supra note 1, at 1884–86 (describing the costs and risks involved
in seeking to invalidate a patent); Wagner, supra note 121, at 2150 (defining the
“presumption of validity”).
271. Rantanen, supra note 34, at 14.
272. Ford, supra note 5, at 102–03, 114–15.
273. Rantanen, supra note 34, at 15, 17, 19.
274. Id. at 23–24.
275. It is admittedly challenging to distinguish situations where the examiner did
not appreciate the full claim scope as it existed at the time of issuance and situations
in which the malleability of claims was used to expand claim scope ex post.
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the statutory criteria276 or raise the bar and make it harder for a
claimed invention to satisfy the statutory criteria. However, this
century’s changes to the patentability criteria have generally raised the
bar of patentability277—making it easier to establish that a claimed
invention is unpatentable as obvious,278 indefinite,279 and, most
significantly, patent ineligible subject matter.280
Thus, an issued patent that was patentable and properly issued based
on the statutory criteria of patentability at the time of issuance could
become unpatentable and therefore invalid because of retroactive judicial
adjustments that make one or more statutory criteria of patentability
more demanding.281 A finding of patentability in examination and
finding of invalidity ex post may be fully consistent and both correct if the
statutory criteria of patentability changed in the intervening years.
III. THE REALITY OF EX POST PATENT INVALIDATION
The realities of patent examination discussed in Part II undermine
the conventional wisdom that ex post invalidation performs the exact
same task as examination, functions solely to correct errors or mistakes
made by the Patent Office in issuing patents, and demonstrates that
the patent should not have been issued in the first place.282 To be sure,
sometimes ex post invalidation serves this conventionally assumed
review and correction function. However, scholars incorrectly assume
that ex post invalidation in and of itself is evidence of examiner error
in issuing the patent or, relatedly, that any issued patent that presently
fails the statutory criteria of patentability reflects an examiner error.283
The structural barriers that prevent a complete evaluation of
patentability in Patent Office examinations are absent or mitigated during
ex post invalidation in litigation or Patent Office post-issuance
276. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 32, at 587–88 (describing how 1990s court decisions
suddenly made business methods patent eligible when they were thought to be
ineligible in the 1980s).
277. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1,
10–11 (2016).
278. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
279. See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014).
280. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013); Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
281. La Belle, supra note 1, at 1883.
282. See supra Section I.C.
283. See supra Section I.C.
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proceedings. Thus, ex post invalidation can serve, in effect, as the first
opportunity to evaluate the aspects of the patentability determination not
amenable to the structure of ex ante patent examination or the aspects of
the patentability determination that have changed since examination.
To be fair, there are not necessarily sharp boundaries between the
functions of ex post invalidation, nor can any particular ex post
invalidity decision definitively be classified as falling into one category
or another. The goal is not to oversimplify ex post invalidation as
readily dividable into these categories but the exact opposite—to show
that ex post invalidation is more nuanced, complex, and varied than
the simplistic conventional wisdom.
A. Ex Post Invalidation as Examination
The basis for ex post invalidation provides a means for identifying,
with some degree of certainty, when ex post invalidation is serving to
provide an initial examination of patentability, rather than to review
and correct the Patent Office’s work. And empirical data, particularly
Professor Stephen Yelderman’s recent studies of the types of prior art
used to invalidate patents in litigation and Patent Office proceedings,284
indicates that nearly half of all invalidations in litigation, though much
less in Patent Office post-issuance proceedings, seem to perform an
examination, not review and correction, function.285 These numbers are
only a floor, not a ceiling, on ex post invalidation’s examination function,
since other circumstances where this occurs are harder to identify.
Selection effects are undoubtedly at play, as the data is based on a
small number of cases litigated to final judgment that resulted in
invalidation. Litigants may be more likely to choose grounds of
invalidation that function as initial examination, rather than review
and correction, perhaps exactly because they believe it easier to
convince the decision maker to invalidate the patent when the matter
was not before the Patent Office or suited for its determination.
Additionally, litigants may be more likely to pursue to final judgment
or achieve a judgment of invalidation in such cases, again because the
decision maker is more amenable to such arguments or, alternatively,
because there is greater uncertainty about the outcome. However,
284. Stephen Yelderman, Prior Art in Inter Partes Review, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2705, 2728
(2019); Yelderman, supra note 33.
285. See Yelderman, supra note 33, at 886 (noting that even if the examiner did the
best search possible and fully appreciated all of the prior art found, examination would
only preclude 52–55% of district court invalidations); see also infra Section III.A.1.
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because the present question is the role that ex post invalidation
functionally performs in actual litigation, these selection effects do not
undermine the resulting conclusions.
1.

Ex post invalidation and unexamined categories of prior art
Some circumstances where ex post invalidation performs an initial
examination function, rather than a review and correction function,
are readily identifiable because they are based on one of the categories
of prior art not amenable to ex ante examination.
Most obviously, invalidation based on a patent application that was
unpublished, and therefore uncitable, during examination necessarily
serves as an initial evaluation of patentability against that prior art.286
Yelderman’s data shows that 7–16% of anticipation findings and 18–
35% of obviousness findings in litigation and 26–38% of invalidations
in inter partes review relied on U.S. patents that were secret when the
invalidated patent application was filed.287 Not all of these invalidations
reflect an initial examination function, however, because many of
these applications were published and therefore became citable, after
the invalidated application was filed but before it was issued.288 Yet to be
effectively useable in examination, the prior art applications would have
had to have been published by the time the examiner was actually
conducting prior art searches or making the patentability determinations.
Invalidation based on activity prior art—sales and uses of the
claimed invention—is the next clearest example of an examination
function. Rarely, this prior art is accessible in examination, such as
when it was disclosed by the applicant or has a prominent documentary
trail.289 But given the near-impossibility of the examiner’s finding and
considering this type of prior art in ex ante examination, even with
greater time and resources,290 invalidation based on activity prior art is
best classified as performing an initial examination function, rather
than serving to review and correct the Patent Office’s work. Ex post
invalidations frequently function to provide an initial evaluation of
286. See Yelderman, supra note 33, at 866 n.121 (noting that due to unpublished
patent applications a patent may be valid when granted “but later become invalid as a
result of subsequent events in the life of a different pending application”).
287. Id. at 868; Yelderman, supra note 284, at 2729.
288. See Yelderman, supra note 284, at 2728 n.92 (noting that 98% of the
invalidating patents in inter partes review that were unpublished at the time of filing
had become published by the time of issuance).
289. See supra Section II.A.2.
290. See supra Section II.A.2.
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patentability against activities prior art, with over half of all anticipation
findings and 29% of all obviousness findings in litigation relying, at least
in part, on prior art activities.291 The vast majority of these invalidating
activities were not cited in examination,292 further confirming that the
invalidation was not serving a review and correction function.
Similarly, greater time and resources might allow the examiner to
find and rely on marginally more nontraditional and informal
publications, such as those which happen to be disclosed by the
applicant, to exist in a searchable database, or are able to be found
through examiner internet searching. But this would be pure
happenstance. In litigation, nontraditional publications are not
typically found via a better traditional prior art search of the type that
the Patent Office might be able to conduct with greater resources.
Rather, this type of prior art is generally found because of the greater
participation or the inquisitorial and investigational powers that exist
in litigation.293 Perhaps they are produced in response to discovery
requests because one employee of a party happens to have a copy on
file. Perhaps a party employee, witness, or expert happens to
remember such a document and mentions it in an interview or
deposition. Or perhaps a party engaged in very high stakes litigation
hired professional investigators.
Ex post invalidation serves as the first realistic chance to evaluate
patentability of a claimed invention against nontraditional publications.
Yelderman’s data suggests this is a noticeable, though not
overwhelming, function of ex post invalidation. In litigation, 5.4% of
anticipation findings and 14% of obviousness findings relied on
nontraditional publications.294 In Patent Office inter partes review, 17%
of all invalidations relied on a nontraditional printed publication.295

291. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 860–61. Activity prior art is excluded from inter
partes review. Id. at 860 n.101.
292. Id. at 882, 884. Nor would strengthening the duty of disclosure be of much
help, since only 27% of the activities that anticipated and 13% of the activities used for
obviousness were those of the patent applicant. Id. at 872.
293. Cf. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 132, at 58 (“A patent can be held invalid because
someone uncovers ‘secret’ prior art—art that was not public at the time of invention, but that
is nevertheless admissible in court under one of several special exceptions.”).
294. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 863–65 (dividing nontraditional publications into
separate categories for “catalog/manual/brochure” and “other” publications).
295. Yelderman, supra note 284, at 2725–26.
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And, again, most of these invalidating nontraditional publications
were not cited in examination.296
In total, 45–48% of all prior art invalidations in litigation, though
only 12% of invalidations in inter partes review, relied on activity or
nontraditional publication prior art not cited in examination.297 For all
of the reasons explained, these invalidations can be said, with a fair
degree of confidence, to be performing as an initial patentability
evaluation, rather than reviewing and correcting the work performed by
the Patent Office. As large as these numbers are, at least in the litigation
context, they understate how often ex post invalidation is serving as
examination, not review and correction. At least some of the significant
number of invalidations based on U.S. patents not published at the time
of filing serve an examination function. Likewise, some of the
approximately 10% of anticipation findings and 20% of obviousness
findings that rely on foreign patents298 probably involve foreign
language patents not suitable for discovery ex ante given the language
and translation limitations in examination. And even invalidations
based on U.S. patents or traditional publications most readily available
in examination may reflect structural limitations that prevent a full
appreciation of claim scope in examination or changes in the statutory
criteria of patentability, as discussed in the following sections.
2.

Ex post invalidation and unexamined claim scope
Even some invalidations based on U.S. patents and traditional
publications may actually function as an initial patentability evaluation
for some of the claim’s full breadth because the ex ante timing of
examination and lack of a motivated adversary made it impossible for
the examiner to recognize the full scope of the claim or because the
claim scope was stretched ex post. Identifying when ex post
invalidation functions as examination of claim scope not amenable to
evaluation in examination is difficult. Examiners do not normally
explicitly identify their understanding of claim scope during

296. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 883.
297. Id. at 886 (explaining that reliance only 52–55% of invalidations in the district
courts rely only on patents, traditional publications, and cited references); Yelderman,
supra note 284, at 2733.
298. See Yelderman, supra note 284, at 2729 (showing similar patterns for inter
partes review); Yelderman, supra note 33, at 873.

2020]

PATENT EXAMINATION AND INVALIDATION

1145

examination.299 Examiners’ comparison of the claimed invention to
the prior art in claim rejections can offer some implicit insight but is
unlikely to reveal an examiner’s full understanding of the claim.300 The
claim construction process in litigation expressly identifies claim scope301
but without a comparable point of reference, it is difficult to say whether
this claim scope is broader than the understanding in examination.
Invalidations based on enablement or written description are
probably the most likely to reflect structural shortcomings that make
examination of the full claim scope impossible in examination. Because
these doctrines function to tie claim scope to the patent owner’s
technical contribution, as described in the specification, invalidation on
these grounds indicates that the patent owner has claimed too
broadly.302 Because these doctrines thus are most likely to address an ex
post broadening of claim scope,303 ex post invalidations on these
grounds could indicate such a broadening occurred.
Of course, sometimes invalidations for enablement or written
description may function to review and correct the Patent Office’s
work because the examiner could have and should have recognized
the claim’s overbreadth in examination, or at least could have with
more time and resources. However, there are reasons to think such
situations will be infrequent. Absent the structural barriers discussed
in Part II, enablement and written description would seem fairly wellsuited for examination. They depend only on the patent document
and background knowledge available to the technically trained patent
examiner,304 not requiring the costly, time-intensive, and complicated
searching that the prior art doctrines do. They also are technologically,
but not legally, intensive doctrines305 and therefore well-suited for

299. See Wagner, supra note 121, at 2150 (noting that examination “virtually never
provides a detailed analysis of claim language”).
300. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s Evolving Impact on
Claim Construction, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 302 (2016) (“[E]xamination tended
to emphasize explicit claim construction less, focusing more on the give and take
between the examiner and the applicant.”).
301. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (describing claim construction as defining all claim terms in dispute).
302. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Written Description Gap, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 345, 347–
48 (2013).
303. Oskar Liivak, Overclaiming Is Criminal, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1417, 1426 (2018).
304. See supra Section III.A.1.
305. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (written description); MPEP, supra note 57, § 2164 (enablement).
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technologically, but not legally, trained examiners. Thus, absent the
structural barriers to complete examination, examiners would seem
less likely to err on the enablement and written description doctrines
than the prior art doctrines. For that reason, many, though not all,
enablement and written description invalidations likely reflect the
structural limitations of examination, particularly the inability to
appreciate the full claim scope and the lack of a motivated adversary.
Thus, invalidations based on enablement and written description
will often be another example when ex post invalidation serves an
initial examination function, rather than to review and correct the
Patent Office’s work. These doctrines are responsible for an additional
6.6% of invalidations in litigation,306 though are not an available basis
for invalidation in inter partes review.
3.

Ex post invalidation and changed patentability doctrines
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that invalidation shows that
the patent “never should have issued in the first place,”307 the patent
may have been patentable and properly issued based on the statutory
criteria as it then existed but subsequently become unpatentable
because of later changes to the criteria. When this occurs, invalidation
functions as a form of supplemental examination to account for these
changes that could not be accounted for in initial examination.308 The
data suggests that this supplemental examination function is a major
part of what ex post invalidation does, at least in recent years.
Some situations where ex post invalidation serves a supplemental
examination function to account for changed governing law are easy
to identify. Before a series of Federal Circuit and Supreme Court cases
beginning in the late 2000s, the threshold for patent-eligible subject
matter was easily satisfied.309 Of a sample of 138 patents invalidated in
litigation in a late 1990s empirical study, only one was invalidated on
the grounds of patent-eligible subject matter.310 In another study of all
district court cases filed in 2008 and 2009, there were only twenty-six
306. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 854.
307. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96 (2011).
308. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 256 (“Given the fundamental nature of these changes
to patent law, it is not surprising that the PTAB would institute review and then invalidate
many claims issued, reexamined, or litigated before these cases were handed down.”).
309. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 621
(2018) (referring to section 101 of the Patent Act as an afterthought until recently).
310. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998).
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decisions (not even invalidations) on patent-eligible subject matter.311
By contrast, for anticipation, obviousness, and indefiniteness, there
were over one hundred decisions per doctrine.312
But since the late 2000s, the patent-eligible subject matter
requirement has become much harder to satisfy, due to a series of
Supreme Court decisions that have raised the bar for patent-eligible
subject matter.313 Thus, invalidation of a patent issued before the late
2000s on subject matter grounds almost certainly functions as
supplemental examination to apply a much more demanding patenteligibility test than existed at the time of issuance. In fact, Congress
created one new Patent Office cancellation proceeding, covered
business method review, specifically to “allow[] parties to challenge the
validity of business method patents that, under then-current law, were
presumed valid when issued but, under the intervening court
decisions, are no longer valid.”314 Although Rantanen suggests that
covered business method review ensures that “[p]atents that never
should have issued are being weeded out,”315 the patents were properly
issued under existing law and became unpatentable only due to
subsequent court decisions.
Patent-ineligible subject matter under section 101 was the most
common grounds for ex post invalidation in litigation, accounting for
a full one-third of invalidations in Yelderman’s 2011 to 2017 study.316
Section 101 invalidations began to rise in 2012,317 the same year the
Supreme Court adopted a more demanding test for the doctrine in
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.318 Section 101
invalidations then experienced a significant jump—by about 100 per
year—in 2014,319 when the Supreme Court confirmed and expanded
its stronger section 101 test in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.320
Perhaps a few of these invalidations involved patents that were
311. John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1782 (2014).
312. Id.
313. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 256.
314. Rantanen, supra note 34, at 22.
315. Id. (emphasis added).
316. See Yelderman, supra note 33, at 854.
317. Id. at 888 (showing steady rise from only a few section 101 invalidations to
nearly 60 per year from 2012–2014).
318. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
319. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 888.
320. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
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examined and issued after adoption of the stronger section 101
requirements or the rare patents that would have failed section 101
even without the change in law. However, for most, if not all, of the ex
post invalidations on section 101 grounds functioned as supplemental
examinations, with the claimed inventions patent-eligible under the
doctrine as it existed when issued and only becoming ineligible due to
the Supreme Court’s changes to the section 101 test.
Similarly, the claim indefiniteness doctrine was traditionally seen as
“toothless.”321 But in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the Federal Circuit
began enforcing the indefiniteness requirement more stringently for
software-related claims, which reflect a significant portion of litigated
and invalidated patents.322 Then, in 2014, the Supreme Court adopted
a stricter indefiniteness standard for all patent claims.323 Indefiniteness
was the second most common ground for invalidity in Yelderman’s
study of litigation, responsible for 23% of invalidations in litigation.324
Given that invalidations for indefiniteness rose over Yelderman’s
sample and spiked after 2014,325 this may be another example of ex
post invalidation functioning as supplemental examination to enforce
changes to the statutory criteria of patentability made first by the
Federal Circuit and then by the Supreme Court.326
Identifying other examples where ex post invalidation is performing
a supplemental examination function is not always as easy. In 2007, the
Supreme Court significantly raised the bar for when claimed inventions
are patentable as nonobvious.327 However, because obviousness was
always a common basis for invalidity,328 it is hard to distinguish pre2007 patents that became obvious only because the Supreme Court
raised the legal standard from pre-2007 patents that would have been
invalid as obvious even without this intervening change in law.

321. John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent
Definiteness and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 625 (2016).
322. Allison et al., supra note 312, at 1782–83.
323. Allison & Ouellette, supra note 321, at 619–20 (citing Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901 (2014)).
324. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 854.
325. Id. at 888.
326. A reason for caution in this conclusion is that the Patent Office adopted a
stricter standard for indefiniteness than that used in litigation in 2008, one that was
essentially the same as the standard ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in 2014.
See Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 551, 574 (2017).
327. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 255–56.
328. Allison & Lemley, supra note 310, at 208.

2020]

PATENT EXAMINATION AND INVALIDATION

1149

B. Ex Post Invalidation as Review
Although ex post invalidation often serves as an initial evaluation of
those aspects of the patentability determination not suited for ex ante
examination in the Patent Office, it does also serve its traditionally
assumed function of reviewing and correcting the Patent Office’s
performance in ex ante examination. Ex post invalidation does so for
those parts of the patentability determination that are functionally part
of ex ante examination within the structural realities of the patent
system. Thus, the Patent Office only makes an “error” in examination
when it performs this role inadequately or incorrectly, i.e., when an
examiner approves an unpatentable claimed invention that could have
been rejected within the structural confines of examination.
Sometimes, examiners truly err in their evaluation of patentability,
issuing a patent that could have and should have been rejected within
both the structure of examination and the time and resources
allocated to examination. In such circumstances, ex post invalidation
performs a review and error-correction function well known in the
legal system, one similar to that of appellate courts’ reviewing and
correcting errors by lower courts.
Other times, the error in examination reflects not the examiner’s
shortcomings but rather institutional shortcomings in the time and
resources allocated to examination. In such circumstances, a patent is
issued on a claimed invention that failed the statutory criteria of
patentability and should have been rejected in examination but could not be
rejected because of insufficient time and resources for examination.329
In these circumstances, ex post invalidation performs a somewhat less
familiar review and error-correction function, though one recognized
by Professor Lemley’s “rational ignorance” theory. The system invests
limited resources in the initial examination and tolerates a high error
rate because so few patents ever become relevant, and therefore the
costs of wrongfully issued patents are arguably less than the cost of
improving examination.330 The system then invests much greater
resources in the review stage of ex post invalidation to correct the
inevitable errors resulting from the limited investment made in
examination.331 Importantly, these greater resources are targeted at

329. See Merges, supra note 32, at 598 (noting that “a certain number of invalid patents . . . .
that cannot be cost-effectively eliminated at the examination stage” will be issued).
330. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1500–11.
331. Id.
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correcting errors made in examination and providing a detailed
evaluation of patentability only for the few patents that prove to be
relevant, rather than wasting resources avoiding errors on the large
number of patents that will never matter.332
The idea that ex post invalidation serves to correct examination errors
assumes that the ex post invalidation is an accurate outcome, i.e., that
the claimed invention failed the statutory criteria of patentability at the
time of invalidation. Of course, it is possible that the ex post invalidation
was itself erroneous and the claimed invention satisfied the statutory
criteria of patentability. This possibility is more than hypothetical in
litigation with lay judges and juries and arguments that often tell
simplistic stories of “good” and “bad” actors, rather than focusing
clearly on the statutory criteria as applied to the technological
merits.333 Yet, there is no definitive and objective means of determining
whether a particular patent was or was not patentable other than
examination and ex post invalidation outcomes.334 As recognized by other
scholars, the greater time, resources, and information available in ex post
invalidity proceedings should tend to lead to accurate outcomes.335
When, then, does ex post invalidation perform its traditionally
assumed review and error-correction function? Invalidation based on
prior art that was before the examiner is probably the best example.
For prior art actually considered by the examiner, patent issuance
seems best attributable to either a true error or insufficient time for
the examiner to accurately process the information considered.336 For
prior art that was part of the examination record but not considered
by the examiner, such as that submitted by the applicant, patent
issuance seems best attributable to insufficient time for the examiner
to review all of the prior art. Invalidation based on uncited U.S. patents
is probably the next most likely situation in which ex post invalidation
performs a review and error-correction function. This prior art is the
type best suited for search and discovery in ex ante examination.337
332. Id. at 1497.
333. See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 897–98 (2015).
334. Id. at 897–98.
335. See Lemley, supra note 22, at 1513–14; cf. Rantanen, supra note 25, at 911–12.
But see Farrell & Merges, supra note 160, at 948 (concluding “that litigation is an
unreliable tool for assessing patent validity” because it under-invalidates patents).
336. Cf. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 879 (noting that in “cases in which the
examiner knew about the relevant prior art and failed to appreciate its significance. . . .
all she would need to do is better understand the prior art already in front of her”).
337. See supra Section I.A.1.
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When a patent is invalid based on this type of prior art, the most likely
explanation for its issuance is either that the examiner inadequately
performed the prior art search or had insufficient time to conduct a
thorough search of this readily available prior art.338 Invalidations
based on uncited formal publications and readily accessible foreign
patents—such as those written in or translated into English from
prominent foreign patent jurisdictions339—likewise would seem to
indicate inadequate performance of the examiner’s search
responsibilities or inadequate time in which to carry out these
responsibilities. This conclusion is somewhat less strong because the
structural constraints of examination make formal publications and
foreign patents less accessible to examiners than U.S. patents.
Once again, Yelderman’s data on prior art used to invalidate patents
in litigation and inter partes review sheds light on how often ex post
invalidation performs a review and error-correction function. In
litigation, 45–46% of anticipation findings and 59–65% of obviousness
findings relied only on prior art that was cited in examination or was a
patent (from anywhere in the world) or traditional publication.340 And
37% of obviousness invalidations relied only on cited prior art or U.S.
patents.341 Similarly, 51% of invalidations in inter partes review relied
only on prior art cited in examination or U.S. patents or patent
applications, while 74% relied only on this prior art or traditional
publications like books and journal articles.342
These numbers reflect only a ceiling on how often ex post
invalidation functions to review and correct the Patent Office’s work
in examination. It would be incorrect to assume that all of these
invalidations serve this function, as Yelderman sometimes seems to
do.343 Some of these invalidations may reflect structural shortcomings of
examination: the lack of an adversary to challenge the applicant’s
characterization of the claimed invention and prior art, the lack of
referents to appreciate the full claim scope, post-issuance stretching of

338. See supra Section III.A.1.
339. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 883–85.
340. Id. at 883–86.
341. Id. at 886.
342. Yelderman, supra note 284, at 2733.
343. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 883, 885–86 (arguing that a perfect search and
appreciation of all patents and traditional publications globally would only preclude
“45–46% of district court anticipation events” and “somewhere between 59% and 65%
of district court obviousness events”).
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claim scope by the patent owner, or the language limitations of
examination for foreign patents and publications. And some of these
invalidations likely function as supplemental examination to reconsider
patentability in light of strengthened patentability standards. For
example, Yelderman’s data includes patents invalidated in litigation
between 2011 and 2017344 and in inter partes review in a one-year study
period between 2017 to 2018.345 At least some of the patents invalidated
as obvious, particularly those in litigation, likely would have been
examined prior to 2007 and therefore may have been affected by the
stronger obviousness standard adopted by the Supreme Court in 2007.346
IV. TAKING THE REALITIES OF PATENT EXAMINATION AND EX POST
INVALIDATION SERIOUSLY
The descriptive account in Parts II and III demonstrates that,
contrary to conventional wisdom, the American patent system operates
with only a partial system of ex ante patent examination. The Patent
Office provides an evaluation of patentability at one point in time for
part of the patent owner’s exclusive rights and against only some
categories of prior art. As a result, ex post invalidation sometimes
functions to review and correct the Patent Office’s work, as commonly
thought, but other times functions to provide a first instance
examination of some aspects of the patentability determination.
There is nothing inherently wrong with this division of labor within
the patent system. Apportioning responsibility for initial patent
examination based on the comparative information-gathering and
processing abilities of the Patent Office ex ante, courts in litigation,
and the Patent Office in post-issuance proceedings would be a
perfectly reasonable, and likely efficient, design choice for the patent
system. Whether the current ad hoc distribution discussed in Parts II
and III is optimal or whether the distribution should be altered in
some way by addressing the structural limits of examination discussed
in Part II is left for other work.
For present purposes, the more limited takeaway is that the design
of the patent system does not reflect the functional divide of
examination and dual role of invalidation but rather a formalist view
344. Id. at 851.
345. Yelderman, supra note 284, at 2708.
346. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8, at 257 (noting that both PTAB and district court
invalidations tend to be concentrated in the fields most affected by recent Supreme
Court changes to patent law, including KSR).
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that Patent Office examination offers a complete evaluation of
patentability while invalidation serves to review and correct the Patent
Office’s work. The following sections detail how the complicated
realities of examination and invalidation require rethinking the role
and design of ex ante examination, invalidation in district court
litigation, and Patent Office post-issuance proceedings.
A. Rethinking Examination: Inevitable Ignorance and the Patent
Examination Funnel
Patent examination’s purpose is typically described as a “substantive
screen” that seeks to issue only worthy patents and deny unworthy
patents.347 Examination and issuance is therefore used as evidence of
the patentability of the claimed invention and as a proxy for
entitlement to patent protection. The presumption of validity and
heightened burden of proof for invalidity in litigation, discussed in the
next section, are one such example. Likewise, investors and others
treat patent issuance as evidence of the quality of the claimed
invention, given the supposed expertise of the examiner as to the
claimed invention’s novelty and nonobviousness.348 Others find it
inconsistent for the Patent Office’s examination arm to find the
statutory criteria of patentability met and grant the patent only to have
the Patent Office’s PTAB part later find one or more of those criteria
unsatisfied and invalidate the patent.349
However, patent examination and issuance are weak evidence and
unreliable proxies for patentability and entitlement to patent protection
because of the structural limits and incomplete examination detailed in
Part II. To some extent, this is a reminder of Mark Lemley and Carl
Shapiro’s important recognition that a patent is a probabilistic right, in
part because even after patent issuance, “considerable uncertainty will
continue to exist about its validity and scope.”350 But the traditional
description of patents as probabilistic rights treats examination as

347. Ford, supra note 1, at 835.
348. See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1306 (2009)
(noting this view but also the contrary view that “the Patent Office’s pronouncements
are not very meaningful”).
349. See, e.g., ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 117, at 4, 32.
350. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 85 (2005).
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probative, not dispositive, of patentability.351 The structural limits of Part
II show that patents are not merely probabilistic rights where examination
and issuance are probative, but not dispositive, evidence of entitlement to
patent protection. Rather, issued patents are, in some respects, putative
rights that reflect a claim to exclusivity that only has been partially vetted.
The structural limits of examination would seem to provide further
support for Lemley’s rational ignorance theory that “the PTO doesn’t
do a very detailed job of examining patents, but we probably don’t
want it to.”352 In fact, this Article goes further than Lemley. Lemley and
his critics share the premise that ex ante examination and ex post
invalidation are interchangeable, such that the only relevant question
is the most efficient allocation of responsibility between the two for this
shared task.353 In doing so, they overlook or minimize the structural
limits discussed in Part II that make a complete evaluation of
patentability impossible, regardless of the time and money invested,
without fundamental changes to the core features of examination. The
issue is not merely deciding whether the Patent Office is rationally or
irrationally ignorant. In significant respects, the Patent Office is
inevitably ignorant. At the very least, the Patent Office’s inevitable
ignorance should be recognized, for example, by formally limiting
examination to U.S. patents and perhaps formal publications and
foreign patents. And perhaps examination should be formally
recognized as evaluating only claim scope commensurate with the
embodiments in the disclosure—the exact opposite of the formal
broadest reasonable interpretation standard that currently applies but
that is functionally impossible for examiners to execute. If a patent
owner wants to assert a broader claim scope later, the facts of
examination and issuance should be of no relevance.
The Patent Office’s inevitable ignorance and structural ineffectiveness
as a substantive screen of patentability, regardless of resources, would
seem to support proposals to abolish ex ante examination in favor of a
351. See Rantanen, supra note 25, at 912 (noting “that a patent claim, when it issues,
may or may not actually be valid” because “[n]o one seriously contends that the patent
office gets it right all the time”).
352. Lemley, supra note 22, at 1497.
353. Compare Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 980 (“Should we increase the
resources at the Patent Office in an effort to increase the quality of issued patents, or
should we forego those marginal investments and reserve a larger residual role for the
courts?”), with Lemley, supra note 22, at 1531 (“For the PTO to gather all the information
it needs to make real validity decisions would take an enormous investment of time and
resources. Those decisions can be made much more efficiently in litigation . . . .”).
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registration system that leaves substantive evaluation of patentability to ex
post invalidation proceedings.354 Yet, in their data-intensive challenge
to Lemley’s rational ignorance theory, Michael Frakes and Melissa
Wasserman provide data indicating that patent examination is doing
something useful.355 Using the different allocations of time per
application given to junior and more senior patent examiners, they
found that the longer the examiner had to examine an application,
the less likely the application was to result in a patent involved in
litigation or PTAB proceedings.356 Specifically, they found that
doubling examination time would result in a 44% decrease in expected
litigation and a 72% decrease in PTAB challenges.357 They speculated that
“[t]his may be due to the fact that the expansion in examination time
leads to the issuance of fewer patents overall and fewer invalid patents in
particular.”358 They concluded that the Patent Office could be an effective
substantive screen of invalidity if allotted more resources.359
This data is in tension with the Patent Office’s (partial) inevitable
ignorance detailed in this Article, as well as Yelderman’s data
confirming that greater examination is unlikely to prevent a significant
percentage of prior art invalidations in litigation and the PTAB.
Yelderman acknowledges this tension and resolves it by noting that
Frakes and Wasserman are focused on case filings, whereas he is
focused on findings of invalidity.360 He suggests that while increased
examination time may eliminate patents that would be asserted in
litigation but resolved in early stages, it does not eliminate the type of
patents that would make it all the way to a finding of invalidity.361
An alternative way to reconcile the Patent Office’s inevitable
ignorance and both Frakes and Wasserman’s and Yelderman’s data is

354. See supra Section I.B.2 (noting such arguments). Jonathan Masur suggested
that patent examination functions as a costly screen that weeds out low-value patents
that are not worth the cost of examination, though he acknowledges that this function
could be performed by simply raising Patent Office fees rather than requiring
substantive examination. Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 85, at 688–92.
355. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 981 (“[W]e thus conclude the opposite of
Lemley: society would be better off investing more resources into the Agency to improve
patent quality than relying upon ex post litigation to weed out invalid patents.”).
356. Id. at 984, 998.
357. Id. at 999, 1007.
358. Id. at 999.
359. Id. at 1020, 1023.
360. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 877–78.
361. Yelderman, supra note 33, at 887.
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that the primary function of examination is not to effectively screen
out unpatentable claimed inventions but rather to narrow the scope of
the claimed invention. Applicants draft their own claims and tend to
draft them as vaguely and/or broadly as possible.362 To overcome
examiner rejections in examination, applicants often amend their
claims to narrow their scope.363 This narrowed claimed invention may
still be unpatentable, but the structural barriers to a complete
evaluation may prevent the examiner from recognizing its
unpatentability. This would account for both the Patent Office’s
inevitable ignorance and Yelderman’s data. At the same time, the
narrowed claim scope means that the patent owner has less exclusive
control and is therefore less able to assert infringement,364 which would
account for the decreased case filings Frakes and Wasserman predict
from increased examination.
Thus, examination might be beneficial not because the process of
application, prior art search, rejection, amendment, and ultimate
grant functions as an effective substantive screen of patentability.
Rather, examination may be beneficial because this process, even with
the narrow U.S. patent focus and lack of referents for claim scope,
functions as an effective funnel that narrows the broad opening claims
of the applicant to a more limited claim scope. The more limited claim
scope gives the patent owner less power over the market and
subsequent developments. Even if this narrower patent is still
unpatentable, its narrow claim scope makes it less significant,
minimizing the costs imposed by invalid patents.
The concept of examination as a claim scope funnel is just a
hypothesis that needs more exploration and data, but it is one that is
consistent with both Yelderman’s and Frakes and Wasserman’s data.
Frakes and Wasserman make passing reference to the possibility that
narrower claim scope resulting from more vigorous examination may
help explain the reduction in case filings.365 And other scholars have
noted the claim narrowing function of examination, though often in

362. Liivak, supra note 303, at 1428–31; Risch, supra note 32, at 188.
363. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L.J. 181, 202 (2008) (“[I]n a significant majority of cases, the prosecution process
requires the applicant to amend her claims, presumably to make them narrower.”).
364. Yelderman, supra note 85, at 100 (“The broader the claim, the greater the
infringement value . . . .”).
365. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 995 & n.77, 999 & n.85.
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passing or as a subsidiary function to screening for patentability.366 To
the extent the primary benefit of examination is claim scope narrowing,
rather than patentability evaluation, reforms and additional resource
allocations should focus on this narrowing function. Such reforms could
include providing more explicit interpretation of claim scope in
examination or enhancing the written description and enablement
doctrines that are intended to keep claim scope commensurate to the
technological contribution.
B. The Presumption of Validity and the Different Jobs of Examination
and Invalidation
An issued patent is presumed valid in litigation, with the burden on
the challenger to establish invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.367 This heightened burden is traditionally justified by the
presumption that the expert Patent Office, tasked with evaluating the
patentability of a claimed invention in examination, has done its job
correctly.368 Scholars have relentlessly attacked this heightened burden,369
focusing on how the Patent Office’s well-recognized resource constraints
give little reason to presume its patentability determinations are correct.370
The recognition that ex post invalidation functions not just to
correct examiner errors, or even to supplement the Patent Office’s
constrained resources, but also to serve as an initial evaluation of
patentability in some circumstances, or a supplemental evaluation of
patentability in light of changed circumstances, provides further
ammunition for those challenging the presumption of validity.

366. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 4–5 (“[E]ven though the PTO ultimately grants patents on a large
majority of the applications it receives, it may still be serving an important gatekeeper
function by requiring applicants to narrow their claims.”); Lemley & Sampat, supra note
363, at 202 (“Requiring an applicant to narrow a patent provides a useful social function
akin to weeding out bad patents.”); Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 85, at 696 (“Even
patents that are improvidently granted may be substantially narrowed in the course of
examination, as examiners cancel or restrict the least tenable claims.”).
367. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011).
368. Id.; Cotropia et al., supra note 143, at 845.
369. See Cotropia et al., supra note 143, at 845 (summarizing literature).
370. See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 363, at 186 (noting that proposals “to eliminate
the clear and convincing evidence presumption as unwarranted. . . . are based on the
assumption that the PTO is not doing a good job of weeding out bad patent applications”).
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Likewise, it suggests that proposals to apply the heightened burden of
proof in PTAB proceedings371 are misguided.
However, this Article offers a new perspective that differs from the
typical attacks on the heightened presumption of validity. Rather than
focusing on whether the presumption of correct job performance is
warranted, Parts II and III indicate that the presumption of validity is
based on a false premise—that the “job” of the Patent Office is the
same as that of courts in litigation, such that courts should defer to
performance of this job by the experts in the Patent Office when
reviewing that performance. The job of the Patent Office in ex ante
examination only partially overlaps with the job of courts in litigation.
Courts often must also conduct initial patentability evaluations in light
of prior art not structurally suited to examination, consider the full
scope of patent claims not recognized in examination, and/or conduct
a supplemental patentability evaluation in light of changed
circumstances. Given that these tasks were not performed in
examination and courts are conducting these tasks in the first instance,
there is no reason to defer to the Patent Office.
This different perspective on the presumption of validity has
important consequences for at least one policy proposal to improve
patent examination—to grant the heightened presumption of validity
only if applicants opt into (and pay for) a more searching
examination,372 a proposal endorsed by then-candidate Barack Obama
in 2007.373 These proposals for “gold-plated” patents are premised on
the assumption that the only things preventing the Patent Office from
conducting an examination that would warrant a presumption of
correctness are time and resource constraints.374 But greater time and
resources in examination do not fully justify a heightened burden of

371. See SENATOR CHRIS COONS, THE STRONGER PATENTS ACT OF 2019 SECTION-BYSECTION ANALYSIS (2019), https://www.coons.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/STRONGER
%20Patents%20section-by-section%20(2019-07-10).pdf [https://perma.cc/YX6Y-S9PM].
372. See, e.g., Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter
2005–2006, at 10, 12–13; Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 132, at 50; Wagner, supra note
121, at 2162, 2164.
373. Dennis Crouch, Barack Obama’s Patent Reform Initiatives, PATENTLYO (Nov. 14, 2007),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2007/11/barak-obamas-pa.html
[https://perma.cc/5JNLYXLZ].
374. See Lemley et al., supra note 372, at 12 (contending that “applicants should be
allowed to ‘gold-plate’ their patents by paying for the kind of searching review that
would merit a presumption of validity”).
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proof in litigation, given that the Patent Office in examination is
performing only part of the job performed by courts in litigation.
Thus, the more complex and nuanced picture of examination and
invalidation offered in this Article suggests that the heightened burden
of proof for invalidity in litigation is unwarranted. Or, less boldly, it
should be scaled back to reflect the tasks actually performed in examination
by applying, for example, only to prior art considered in examination375
and/or U.S. patents. Alternatively, fully retaining the heightened burden
of proof requires a new theoretical justification, such as the reliance
interests that patent owners develop based on the issued patent.376
C. Rethinking the Design of Patent Office Cancellation Proceedings
Patent office post-issuance proceedings are typically described as
performing the same task as ex ante examination, thereby serving to
review and correct errors in initial examination. For example, in
rejecting Article III and Seventh Amendment challenges to these
proceedings, the Supreme Court relied, in part, on the fact that Patent
Office examination was undoubtedly constitutional and “[i]nter partes
review involves the same basic matter as the grant of a patent” and
“considers the same statutory requirements that the PTO considered
when granting the patent,” with the key difference being the timing of
the two procedures.377 Likewise, in rejecting the applicability of state
sovereign immunity, the Federal Circuit relied on the fact that Patent
Office cancellation proceedings “are designed to allow the USPTO to
harness third parties for the agency to evaluate whether a prior grant
of a public franchise was wrong . . . .”378 On first glance, this Article
would seem to suggest that the Court’s rationale is wrong (even if the
results may have been right) since examination and invalidation only
partially overlap, and invalidation only partially serves to review the
Patent Office’s work in examination.
However, the actual design of the Patent Office post-issuance offers
some support for the Court’s rationale. These proceedings’ design is
better suited for ex post invalidation’s review and correction function
than its initial examination function. Other than the short, nine375. See Cotropia et al., supra note 143, at 845, 852 (discussing possibility of limiting
presumption of validity to prior art considered in examination).
376. Greg Reilly, The PTAB’s Problem, 27 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 31, 31, 33, 50 (2019).
377. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1374 (2018).
378. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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month post-issuance window of post-grant review, a patent can only be
challenged in inter partes review for anticipation or obviousness based
on patents and printed publications.379 Thus, post-issuance
proceedings focus on the type of prior art best suited for ex ante
examination—U.S. patents and formal publications. inter partes
review expressly excludes the type of prior art least suited for the
structure of ex ante examination—sales and uses of the invention. It
also excludes the disclosure doctrines of enablement, written description,
and indefiniteness. Because these doctrines “limit how far into the future
a claim can reach,”380 they are the best tools to police the patentability of
the outer reaches of claim scope, where the patent owner claims more
broadly than its technological contribution (reflected in the disclosure in
the specification) would allow.381 These outer limits are impossible for the
examiner to recognize in ex ante examination.
With that said, inter partes review does have some features that
further ex post invalidation’s examination function. It includes foreign
patent documents and nontraditional publications, both of which are
not well-suited for ex ante examination. It is a public, adversarial
proceeding that can occur after market and technological developments
have made the full scope of the claim readily apparent or changes to
the conditions of patentability have occurred. And the PTAB has
greater inquisitorial powers than examiners, including limited
discovery and a live hearing, though not the full scope of inquisitorial
powers of litigation,382 such as subpoenas and depositions of fact
witnesses or live testimony and cross-examination of such witnesses.
All the same, Patent Office post-issuance proceedings appear to have
been designed under the conventional view that the purpose of ex post
invalidation is to review and correct the Patent Office’s work in
examination. The nine-month window for post-grant review is too
short to effectively serve many of the functions of ex post invalidation,
since changed circumstances are unlikely to have occurred and there
often will not yet be a motivated challenger, and perhaps not time to
investigate and find the types of prior art unsuited for examination.
inter partes review excludes categories of prior art least suited to ex
ante examination and doctrines most suitable to addressing the full
expanse of claim scope not capable of recognition in ex ante
379.
380.
381.
382.

See supra Section I.A.
Liivak, supra note 303, at 1426.
See id. at 1431–32.
Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 926 F.3d at 1336, 1339.
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examination. And it is limited to the doctrines of anticipation and
obviousness, preventing the Patent Office from reconsidering the
issuance of a patent when other criteria of patentability have changed
since initial examination. Patent-eligible subject matter offers an acute
example of this last shortcoming, as commentators struggle to find
ways to quickly and cheaply invalidate patents implicated by the
Supreme Court’s recent revolution in the section 101 requirements
without the availability of Patent Office post-issuance proceedings.
Arguably, this design has it exactly backwards. Leveraging the
expertise of the Patent Office to conduct those aspects of the
patentability evaluation not suited for the structure of ex ante
examination would seem to offer a particularly compelling justification
for the additional costs and inefficiencies of adding Patent Office postissuance proceedings to traditional examination and litigation. As a
result, PTAB proceedings are not living up to their full potential as a
means for evaluating the patentability of claimed inventions.
CONCLUSION
Ex ante patent examination and ex post patent invalidation are
more varied, complicated, and nuanced than commonly thought.
They are not interchangeable substitutes. Rather, ex ante examination
is only capable of giving a partial evaluation of compliance with the
statutory criteria of patentability. The patentability evaluation in
examination is a snapshot evaluation at one point in time based only
on a portion of the relevant prior art and only a portion of the actual
scope of the claim. Patent examination and issuance is weak evidence of
the patentability of a claimed invention. Conversely, the Patent Office is
not entirely at fault for the presence of issued patents that fail the statutory
criteria. Invalid patents exist, in part, because of the basic structure of
examination, which makes the Patent Office, in part, inevitably ignorant.
Indeed, patent examination may function less as a substantive screen of
patentability and more as a funnel to narrow claim scope.
Ex post invalidation is not merely a means of reviewing and
correcting Patent Office errors or supplementing the Patent Office’s
limited resources and rational ignorance. Sometimes it functions as
the initial opportunity to evaluate patentability against the full scope
of the claim or certain categories of prior art. Other times, it serves as
a supplemental evaluation of patentability in light of changed claim
scope or patentability criteria. Ex post invalidation thus serves a broad
function that only partially overlaps with ex ante examination. The
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heightened burden of proof in litigation is unwarranted, at least in
part, not because the Patent Office is bad at its job but because the
Patent Office’s job in examination is not the same as a court’s in
litigation. Finally, the design of PTAB proceedings is bizarre because it
effectively excludes circumstances in which a second look from the
Patent Office would seem the most warranted.

